30 Teams in 30 Days

You know what, let's do this instead, this guy is nuts, and it's not we don't appreciate good info.

I will post these as this guy posts them because i find it more than excellent stuff to walk into 2013 Knowing!!

2013 PREVIEW: LOS ANGELES ANGELS

For some it’s Groundhog Day, for others it’s the sighting of a specific bird species, while for those still in the MTV demographic it may be the arrival of Spring Break. For my fellow residents of San Francisco, however, the 49ers trip to Super Bowl XLVII provided baseball fans with the perfect yardstick of progress. While it may not have been true in the late ‘80s or early ‘90s, to my eye San Francisco is now a baseball town first. It was fun and a nice diversion to live in the city that sent the 49ers to New Orleans but, frankly, the Super Bowl’s primary purpose each February is to serve as a harbinger for the reporting of pitchers and catchers to Spring Training.

And if Spring Training is about to begin, than it’s time for me to dust off the 30 Teams in 30 Days preview series that I compiled for the 2012 season.

There is a lot going on between now and Opening Day. My book, Trading Bases, A Story About Wall Street, Gambling, and Baseball comes out on March 7 and associated with the book’s publication, there will be various media events and appearances in different cities. I’ll pass along those dates as they approach; today I’ll start with a big one I’m enormously excited about.

The week before the book drops (publishing lingo!), I’ll be a presenting speaker at the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, in Boston. Thanks to Bill Simmons’ attendance over multiple years, you may be more familiar with the conference by the moniker he tagged it with, Dork-a-Palooza. Fittingly then, among panels such as The Nerds Won (featuring Michael Lewis, Mark Cuban, Nate Silver and others) I’ll be presenting a lecture titled Sports Analytics as an Alternative Asset Class.

If the conference is live-streamed or when the presentations are video archived, I will provide links.

Now, let’s get to the start of the 2013 preview series.

(Please note that the final projection at the end of this piece, and for all teams going forward, will change to some degree over the next six weeks due to injuries, playing time adjustments, etc. Prior to Opening Day, I will present the final projections in a traditional standings format.)



* * *

Los Angeles Angels



What They Did: 89-73, 3rd Place AL West

Actual Runs: Scored 767 runs, Allowed 699.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 88.5 (0.5 below actual)

Restated: Scored 786 runs, Allowed 690.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 90.6 (1.6 above actual)

(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Significant deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Angels, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 91 games.)



I would have voted for Mike Trout.

I appeared on a podcast on the eve of the playoffs last fall and subsequently got called out on Twitter for being a Cabrera-truther. That wasn’t entirely accurate but I cop to being wishy-washy on the podcast. I should have stated unequivocally that, like virtually everyone in the sabermetric community, I would have voted for Trout as the AL MVP. However, I differ substantially from the majority of modern baseball analysts in that I absolutely refuse to condemn anyone who voted for Miguel Cabrera. Don’t let anyone with a computer, a respected platform, and indignant prose tell you otherwise: This was not Maury Willis over Willie Mays (1962) or Bob Welch over Roger Clemens (1990) or even a Hall of Fame vote for Jack Morris. Lumping a 2012 AL MVP vote for Cabrera with those arguments diminishes the injustice of the former examples.

In fact, rather than belittle those who voted for Cabrera, perhaps the sabermetric community ought to acknowledge their own role in shaping the judgment of today’s voters and consider it progress rather than lament the results. Think about what the sabermetric community has taught us over the last twenty years as it applied to the Trout vs. Cabrera case:

The Importance of OPS OPS, or On-base Plus Slugging didn’t even exist as a statistic twenty years ago. Today, OPS has made its way onto the back of baseball cards and on-screen graphics when a player comes to the plate. That advancement, that migration into the mainstream, is totally due to the influence of the sabermetric community. They taught both casual fan and the veteran reporter the importance of OPS over other significantly flawed summary statistics. Miguel Cabrera led the majors in OPS in 2012. Perhaps that influenced voters.

Speed is Overrated Maury Willis, despite his 104 steals, would never win an MVP today over a player that got on base more often (.384 to .347) and outslugged him by a mammoth amount (.615 to .373) as happened in 1962 when Willie Mays finished 2nd in NL MVP voting. Chuck Tanner would be vilified for sabotaging so many great hitting Pirates teams by letting Omar Moreno bat leadoff and get 700+ plate appearances a year just for the sake of getting 70+ stolen bases (and making another 20+ outs a year on the basepaths.) Today we know players like Moreno and Vince Coleman simply didn’t create much value – even when they played at their performance peaks. While I agree the pendulum may have swung too far (Trout’s league leading 49 stolen bases in 54 attempts had undeniable value) I think today’s analysts would agree that it’s better to cost Mike Trout a few MVP votes than going back to the days of extolling the value of say, Juan Pierre.

RBI’s are a Teammate Dependent Statistic An absolutely correct assertion and the sabermetric community deserves credit for relentlessly driving this point home to the average baseball fan. I read many well-reasoned (although indignantly toned) articles that scolded those who blindly give Cabrera too much credit for RBI opportunities that resulted from hitting 3rd in the Tigers lineup while Trout bats leadoff. You know what else is a teammate dependent result? Hitting into double plays. Look, if you’re going to dismiss or minimize Cabrera’s league-leading 139 RBI (56 more than Trout) you can’t also cite his league-leading 28 GIDP (21 more than Trout). I observed some extremely respected modern-day analysts make this exact mistake in logic, complete with the “indignant tone” I referred to above. I guarantee you if Cabrera played on the Mariners he wouldn’t hit into as many double plays because Seattle never has any players on base.

When it Comes to Defense, Your Eyes Lie This might be the most important one of all because so much of Trout’s support comes from those extolling his defensive prowess. For instance, Dave Schoenfield’s Sweet Spot Blog on ESPN – as forward-thinking an outlet as possible – named Trout the best defensive player in all of baseball in 2012. Here’s my take: Mike Trout positively wasn’t even the best defensive player on his team. Let’s discuss this. Probably the number one topic of derision by the sabermetric community since the year 2000 is the quality of Derek Jeter’s defense. They convincingly and incontrovertibly have exposed Jeter’s defense as below-average to abysmal by citing his range while holding constant various contributing factors. Let’s use those same tests on Mike Trout: When Mike Trout played centerfield for the Los Angeles Angels last year, on a per-inning basis he caught fewer balls (and had fewer assists) than Peter Bourjos. When he played left field, he caught fewer balls, etc. than Vernon Wells. Yes, Vernon Wells! When Trout played right field Torii Hunter outperformed him. Mike Trout had above-average putouts compared to all American League outfielders but the Angels sport an extreme fly ball, low-strikeout pitching staff in a home park that suppresses homers; that inflates the success of all the Angels outfielders. When you hold constant for the pitching staff, the opponents, and the venue however, Mike Trout was second best at every outfield position he played on his own team behind three different players. What about those four over-the-fence home runs he robbed opposing players of which the Sweet Spot said amounted to “a chunk of Trout’s 23 Defensive Runs Saved”? Like Jeter diving into the stands and emerging with a bloody chin, they represent incredible feats of athleticism and perhaps unfairly create an image in the minds of fans of a superior defender. In Trout’s case they also contributed mightily to his WAR. In reality however, those catches didn’t help the Angels win a single game because the combined score in the four games he made those highlight-reel plays was 32-11.

I would have voted for Trout because I prefer a best-of-Ryan Braun-like batting line combined with best-of-Jimmy Rollins-like baserunning skills plus participation in baseball’s best overall defense to Cabrera’s Triple Crown achievement. But I beg other like-minded analysts to lose their outrage because, this being February, it’s apt to point out, Cabrera’s win was not the equivalent of Forrest Gump over Pulp Fiction.

* * *

Last year, the Mets provided the most interesting exercise in critical reasoning in evaluating a team’s prospects from one year to the next. Recall the Mets entered the 2012 season without the services of down-ballot MVP candidate Jose Reyes who led the 77-win team in 2011. Subsequently, expectations were for the Mets to struggle to win 70 games in 2012. But a closer examination revealed the Mets weren’t replacing their All-Star shortstop with a replacement level shortstop. Because of position shifts, the 2012 shortstop came from second base in 2011 and the second baseman was 2011’s first baseman. On the margin, the Mets were replacing an above-average hitting shortstop with a league-average hitting first baseman. That was actually not much of a drop-off. As such, the Mets were vastly underrated at this time last year.

Let’s apply that same logic to the 2013 version of the Los Angeles Angels. As noted above, the Angels scored 767 runs in 2012. However, they played half their games in a ballpark that suppressed offense by 9%. Taking their entire schedule into account, the Angels recorded a 2012 Park Factor of 96. This means, to normalize their runs to a league-neutral context you must divide their 767 runs scored by .96 resulting in 799 runs. Do that for every team and it turns out the Angels had the highest-scoring offense in baseball. So where are they going to find improvement this year?

To Angels fans, there’s a simple answer. They will say off-season free-agent signing Josh Hamilton is an upgrade over the since-traded Torii Hunter. That statement is correct. Josh Hamilton makes the Angels a better team in 2013 than Torii Hunter. And due to aging curves and skill sets the difference is even more pronounced in 2014, 2015 and so on. But, like the Mets last year, it’s important not to be blinded by names. The relevant question for our purposes is: Will Josh Hamilton in 2013 improve on Torii Hunter’s 2012 production? Hunter, although unnoticed by virtually all national media, had a tremendous season at the plate for the Angels – at age 36, in fact, he had his best season ever as a pro.

Hunter hit .313/.365/.451 in 2012. While Hamilton is a lifetime .304/.363/.549 hitter, he’s now on the wrong side of 30 and more importantly, he accumulated those stats playing half his games in Arlington (park factor: 112). In 38 games in Anaheim (half a season of home games) Hamilton has hit just .260/.325/.440. While there’s no doubt Josh Hamilton has a better chance of duplicating Torii Hunter’s 2012 production in 2013 than Torii Hunter does, I still project a drop-off, possibly notable, in right field production for the Angels. In fact, I see the same problem replacing Kendrys Morales’ production at DH as well as drop-offs from Mike Trout and Albert Pujols, due to regression and age respectively. That could be a problem if light-hitting Peter Bourjos is going to get 600 plate appearances – 400 more than in 2012. (On the positive side of projections, a full season of plate appearances from a healthy Chris Iannetta would keep back-up catchers Hank Conger and John Hester safely on the bench.)

On defense, Hamilton will certainly not catch as many balls in right field as Torii Hunter would, but thanks to continuity at the other seven fielding positions, the Angels regression from the best defense in baseball (tied with Seattle) may be minor. Still, it’s not going to get better.

Elsewhere on the other side of the scoring ledger, the Angels have only made two changes to a rotation which was, once you adjust for park factors, mildly below average. Joe Blanton and Jason Vargas will replace Dan Haren and half-seasons each from Zach Greinke and Jerome Williams. Even if that’s an upgrade (thanks, largely to Haren’s very disappointing season in 2012) – and I remain skeptical it is – there is no way Jered Weaver is going 20-5 again with a sub 3.00 ERA. Weaver has managed to use the pitching-friendly confines of Anaheim to get the most out of his below-league average strikeout rate and extreme fly ball tendencies – to the point of repeatedly mocking my projections – but with his fastball velocity dropping to a career-low last year, I’ll stick my neck out once again: Weaver will finish 2013 with an ERA above 4.00 and the Angels will struggle to win a majority of the games he starts.

The 2013 Angels are one of the more fascinating teams in baseball. The presence of Mike Trout, (at a salary of less than $1 million) means his production per dollar of salary negates every other inefficient contract the Angels are carrying. Trout, Pujols, and Hamilton sounds, on the surface, like a team that is a lock to score 800 runs. If they do, they will easily make the playoffs. Realistically, there is at least a one-year window for everyone on the Angels to peak and win 95 games. But it’s more likely they’ll scratch their way to an upper-80s win season backed by a top-tier run scoring and, at best, league-average run suppression. Just like 2012.



Oddsmakers’ expectations: Not only are the Angels the oddsmakers’ favorite to win the AL West, they are also, more or less, the co-favorites to win the World Series as well. (roughly 7-1, along with the Tigers, based on early Vegas odds). Their opening total wins market of 91 ½, reflects a lot of positive expectations baked into the market for Los Angeles. It’s not necessarily misplaced, just a bit too optimistic. There’s material value on the under.

2013 PREVIEW: TEXAS RANGERS

Texas Rangers

What They Did: 93-69, 2nd Place AL West. Lost Wild Card Game.

Actual Runs: Scored 808 runs, Allowed 707.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 90.8 (2.2 below actual)

Restated: Scored 799 runs, Allowed 672.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 93.8 (0.8 above actual)

(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Rangers, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 94 games.)



On the surface, it sure seemed unlikely that Texas didn’t win the AL West last season. After all they outscored their opponents by more than 100 runs while leading the majors in runs scored. In fact, they were in first place 177 calendar days in a row beginning April 9 until the last day of the season on October 3. It turns out, however, that the cumulative nature of baseball standings masked the fact that while the Rangers were the dominant team in all of baseball during the season’s first quarter, for the remainder of the year, they were not much better than league average. In its first 40 games, Texas played .600 baseball and outscored its opponents by a whopping 80 runs. However, over the remaining 121 games, their run differential was just 21 runs. Meanwhile, over those same last three quarters of the season, the eventual division champion Oakland A’s outscored their opponents by 113 runs. The final standings and the drama of the last series of the season suggested an unlikely champion but the fact is the Rangers were convincingly outplayed by Oakland for a majority of the season.

The question for Rangers fans is how much weight to put on those last three quarters of play?

Ian Kinsler had the worst year of his career at the plate but he’s only 30. It’s not unrealistic to expect a bounce back year. Michael Young (.277/.312/.370) was the biggest problem in the lineup fetching the majority of his playing time at the premium hitting positions of first base and designated hitter all while hitting like an average MLB shortstop (.257/.310/.378). He departed via free agency which presents an opportunity for improvement. However, as discussed yesterday in the Angels preview, so did Josh Hamilton, whose .577 SLG production (2nd best in the AL) has zero chance of being matched by the Rangers new centerfield platoon, Leonys Martin and Craig Gentry. The Rangers hope that gaping hole in year-over-year production will be closed with Lance Berkman manning the DH role. Berkman, however, is 37 and has been healthy exactly one year since 2008. Of course, during that year, 2011, Berkman wielded an exceptionally effective bat in leading the Cardinals to a World Series title. The Rangers hope he has another Comeback Player of the Year campaign left in the tank. Finally, Texas is betting A.J. Pierzynski’s sudden power surge at age 35 (he hit 27 HRs in 520 plate appearances in 2012 after hitting 30 HRs in his previous 1,548 plate appearances) will replace the departed Mike Napoli’s 24 HRs (in just 417 plate appearances).

When the Rangers were in the midst of back-to-back World Series appearances, their farm system was deemed so stocked with talent, they seemed sure to score 800 runs a season for many years. Although they are young, Mike Olt and Jurickson Profar have looked overmatched in the majors so far and as a result, the Rangers suddenly have a depleted line up with a bench that provided dismal support last year. Their streak of 800 run seasons rests on a pair of creaky-kneed newcomers closer to 40 than 30.

Thanks to the ballpark they play half their games in, the Rangers pitching staff is always more effective than their runs allowed indicate. (9th in AL in runs allowed, although 5th adjusted for a park factor of 107.) The good news for the Rangers is the starters should be better this year. Half-seasons of 5.00+ ERA pitching from huge disappointments Roy Oswalt and Ryan Dempster as well as 21 starts from Scott Feldman, another 5.00+ ERA performer, will be improved upon by nearly anyone they give the ball to. If 22 year-old Martin Perez performs well, that will help salvage the reputation of the top-ranked farm system of a couple of season ago. Yu Darvish pitched every bit as well as his most optimistic supporter foresaw including stellar pitching down the stretch when he went 3-0 in five September starts posting a 2.21 ERA. It certainly didn’t look like the league caught to his stuff.

Offsetting that encouraging news is that Texas’ defense, elite in prior years fell to league-average in 2012. That drop may have, somewhat invisibly, cost the Rangers three games compared to 2011 and if it resulted from an aging core of players, it’s not likely to turn around this year. Additionally, the 2012 bullpen was 2nd best in the AL (behind Tampa) in suppressing runs. Due to the fickle nature of year-to-year bullpen results, it’s highly unlikely the Rangers bullpen will be as effective in 2013 due, not just to variance, but departures (notably, Mike Adams) and changing roles as well (Alexi Ogando moving to starter).

Finally, I’ll apply yesterday’s Jered Weaver prediction to Rangers starter Matt Harrison (18-11 3.29 ERA in 2012): A 2013 ERA above 4.00 and a struggle for the Rangers to win half the games he starts. Harrison’s 2012 results – truly top-tier given the venue he calls home – were aided by a special type of “cluster luck.” Harrison stranded 78.6% of the runners who got on base, 5th best in the AL. The average AL starter stranded 71%. However, Harrison – even if you believe he has the ability to raise his game with runners on base – actually pitched worse (less strikeouts, more walks) in those situations. Batters simply hit his pitches at fielders. With his anemic strikeout rate (15.2% -- fifth lowest in the AL among qualified starters) there is little chance he can repeat that performance in similar high-leverage situations in 2013.

The Rangers still have enough firepower to ease into the playoffs as a wild-card team for the second year in a row. In fact, it’s not unrealistic to expect a tight division battle with Los Angeles, or even Oakland and Seattle (gasp!). I believe, with pretty high conviction, that if such a battle is waged in 2013, unlike 2012, it will be conducted at a win level in the 80s not the 90s.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: The Rangers total wins market opened at 86. Even though this falls right in line with my expectations, it still surprised me quite a bit. On the eve of Opening Day last year, the Angels and Rangers markets were 93 and 92 respectively. The Rangers won by four games in posting 90+ wins for the third year in a row. Further, on a day-to-day basis the high-scoring Rangers are a “public” team. I know why I foresee problems for Texas this year, and of course Josh Hamilton switched teams, but I’m surprised the oddsmakers see it the same way. Given the popularity of the Rangers, I expect when we take a look at the pre-Opening Day markets, the Rangers win total will have eased higher. For now though, I think it’s right in line with expectations.


2013 Outlook:

85-77 – Second in AL West, 2nd Wild Card Berth

777 Runs Scored 737 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: OAKLAND ATHLETICS

What They Did: 94-68, 1st Place AL West. Lost 3-2 in ALDS.

Actual Runs: Scored 713 runs, Allowed 614.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 92.0 (2.0 below actual)

Restated: Scored 696 runs, Allowed 626.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 88.8 (5.2 below actual)

(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the A’s, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 89 games.)


Oakland may have been a little bit lucky in how it converted its offensive production into runs – to the tune of a 17 run benefit (713 – 696, see above) but they should still be able to overcome that hurdle and score more runs in 2013. That’s because, with the exception of 33 year-old Coco Crisp, every starter and virtually every offensive contributor will be on right side of 30. (Seth Smith is 30.) No one had a truly outlier season last year, so there is no reason the team that scored 407 runs in the second half of the year should regress meaningfully. (The A’s were the only team in baseball to score more runs in each successive quarter last year.)

The outfield (plus DH) is set, and rock-solid with Crisp, Josh Reddick, Seth Smith and Yoenis Cespedes. (I’m so high on Cespedes, who I think is a realistic way-off-the-radar MVP choice, I will be over-drafting him in every fantasy league.) After years of futility and unconventional choices dating back to Moneyball, it looks like Brandon Moss finally gave the A’s traditional power hitting from the first base position. Beyond that optimism, there are a number of changes in the line up. John Jaso, acquired in the off-season from Seattle for two prospects, will take a majority of starts behind the plate. He didn’t come cheap, and the A’s bought high off of his career season at the plate, but even if Jaso disappoints in terms of his cost, he will almost certainly still improve the A’s production from its catcher compared to 2012. (A’s catchers: 204/.262/325. Jaso: .276/.394/.456). When your new catcher had a higher on-base percentage than your old catchers had slugging, it’s hard not to improve.

The A’s ability to challenge the Angels (and/or Rangers) for the AL West title will come down to how much production they get out of free-agent signing Jed Lowrie at third base, Japanese import Hiroyuki Nakajima as shortstop, and Scott Sizemore at second base coming off a missed 2012 season with an ACL injury. It’s the uncertainty at these positions that keeps the A’s from a higher overall projection.

The A's expect an easier path to even more offensive success than the total runs scored prediction below calls for, but also not so sure the A’s won’t struggle replicating last year’s success in suppressing runs allowed. A’s starters had the 3rd lowest ERA (3.80) in the AL and their relievers had the second lowest. The returning starters will be challenged to not only replicate that success, they must also replace 42 starts from Brandon McCarthy and Bartolo Colon who sported a combined ERA of 3.35 – substantially better than the overall team’s average. I’m skeptical – based on each pitcher’s underlying skill sets – A.J. Griffin, Tommy Milone, and Jarrod Parker can replicate last year’s success and eat up the extra innings required. Newly anointed ace, Brett Anderson certainly displayed the skill set to produce a mid-ish 3 ERA (but not the 2.57 ERA he posted last year in six late season starts) but it may be too optimistic to expect 30 starts from him.

The bullpen is subject to even more possible regression – and it's a very interesting case study, so let’s dive a little deeper. Of all the elite preforming bullpens in baseball last year, only Oakland’s success was somewhat confounding. The A’s pen, 4th in all of baseball with a 2.94 ERA, ranked 14th in strikeout rate and an alarming 26th in walk rate. Bullpens, of course, often inherit runners and the A’s, via their high walk rate actually compounded problems by adding runners to the basepaths. Double plays can correct a lot of those mistakes but the A’s pen was 28th in baseball at inducing groundballs. There is no way that formula can be expected to produce the fourth best ERA in baseball. The bullpen could pitch identically over 500+ innings this year and give up 50 more runs.

It turns out that the reason why the bullpen was so effective reveals yet another variation of cluster luck – this one, perhaps the most hidden of all. As many fans know, looking at an opponents’ Batting Average on Balls In Play (BABIP) gives a decent approximation of a defense’s effectiveness at turning batted balls into outs. For instance, the Marlins opponents hit .300 on balls they hit into the field of play. Therefore the Marlins defense converted 70% of batted balls into outs. (A true measure of defense effectiveness adds a number of additional steps, but for this illustration, we can stop here.)

When the Oakland A’s starters were on the mound, the defense converted batted balls into outs at a 70.7% clip. However, when the relievers pitched the figure was an astounding 75%. How good is 75%? The best overall figure in the league belonged to the Los Angeles Angels at 72.3% – and an additional 2.7% spread is huge. So the A’s defense was simply average (14th in MLB) roughly two-thirds of the time (innings pitched by starters) and better than any overall defense has ever been the other third of the time. (That difference of 4.3% (75% - 70.7%) is way higher than any other team’s.) And that “other third” of the time came in more important, higher-leverage situations because they occurred when relievers were in the game.

This is a classic example of an unsustainable skill improvement in “the clutch”. The A’s defense hasn’t figured out a way to suddenly become the best fielders in baseball when the game is on the line. They simply represent another example of a specific type of cluster luck, and during 2012 their low-strikeout, low-groundball, high-walk bullpen was the beneficiary. When you see such a large increase below in the runs allowed projection for 2013, this is one of the biggest factors.

The projection has the A’s essentially performing at an identical level as the subject of yesterday’s preview, the Texas Rangers. (I “awarded” the Rangers the 2nd Wild Card berth on the flimsy basis of run differential.) The A’s have a number of question marks but thanks to a core of dynamic hitters, there is every reason to believe the excitement that gathered steam at the Coliseum during last season will continue this year and, in a turn of phrase my new friend in Las Vegas might approve of, the “ghosts of 2012” will be awakened.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: Outside of the Baltimore Orioles (AL East previews to come next week) oddsmakers have pegged the A’s to have the largest drop in wins from 2012 to 2013. Oakland won 94 games last year but its opening market this year is 83 ½. That 10 ½ game drop-off seems excessive, and if you believe the bullpen will be nearly as effective as last year, or if you think (like I do) that there is meaningful upside to the runs scored projection, it’s created a downright bargain. The A’s success last year on offense was skill-based and spread among a number of young players who can reasonably be projected to have continued success in 2013.



2013 Outlook:

85-77 – Second (tied) in AL West

722 Runs Scored 684 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: SEATTLE MARINERS

What They Did: 75-87, 4th Place AL West.

Actual Runs: Scored 619 runs, Allowed 651.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 77.3 (2.3 below actual)

Restated: Scored 598 runs, Allowed 647.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 75.1 (0.1 above actual)

(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Mariners, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 75 games.)



Led most visibly by ESPN.com’s fantasy baseball guru, Eric Karabell, the Seattle Mariners have become this year’s sexy Spring Training pick to reach the playoffs. In a piece written last week, Karabell laid out the reasons Seattle could be this year’s Baltimore or Oakland and, in truth, he simply expressed what a number of people have said to me as well. The Mariners, you will hear, will score a lot more runs this year because they’ve acquired legitimate power threats in Kendrys Morales and Michael Morse. Additionally – and I swear you’re going to read this in every Seattle preview as if it’s a breathless revelation – the Mariners have moved in the fences at Safeco! (Sometimes I think people forget that, unlike the domes in America’s newest stadiums, the fences aren’t going to be retractable. They will also be closer when opposing teams are on offense as well.) Further, the logic goes, combine age-related improvement from a trio of under-27 stars-to-be Dustin Ackley, Jesus Montero, and Justin Smoak and add in a strengthened bench led by newly acquired Jason Bay and a rejuvenated Raul Ibanez and the Mariners offense will be greatly improved. Finally, anchored by the dominating Felix Hernandez, the revamped pitching staff looks to get better performances from the back-end starters and the bullpen.

Morales will become the new DH, moving Montero to full-time catcher. That means, on the margin, Morales will be replacing John Jaso in the line-up. I’ve got some disappointing news for Mariners fans: Jaso had a better year in 2012 than Morales. Only once in his career has Morales posted an OPS higher than Jaso’s .850 in 2012, and that was in 2009 (.924) before Morales suffered a severe injury that cost him the majority of 2010 and all of the 2011 season. Morales has had a lower slugging percentage every year since 2009; the Mariners should be very pleased if Morales can simply match the .456 mark Jaso posted last year. By far the Mariners biggest weakness is getting on base (an anemic .296 on-base percentage in 2012, by far the worst in baseball) and in jettisoning Jaso, Seattle traded away the only player on the team who had an OBP above the league average of .319. That stupefying sentence alone sums up why I think there is far too much ground to make up, performance-wise, to make Seattle a credible dark-horse playoff candidate.

Morse, given away by Seattle four years ago after getting just 79 plate appearances over his age 24-26 seasons, returns to the Emerald City (at the cost of John Jaso) after having established himself as a legitimate power threat in Washington. His insertion in the lineup in left field legitimately improves the Mariners run scoring outlook in 2013. He also significantly worsens their defense – more on that below.

Of course, all optimism surrounding the Mariners fortunes are anchored by the same person that anchors the starting rotation. Felix Hernandez was as dominant as ever in 2012, but his record in 2012 reflected the perils of weak offensive support. When Hernandez didn’t throw a complete game shutout – which he did a MLB-leading five times in 2012, his record was merely 8-9.

Hisahi Iwakuma and Blake Beavan return to the rotation as well, although they inspire vastly different levels of fan enthusiasm. After starting 2012 in the bullpen, Iwakuma made 16 starts by the end of the year and had tremendous success going 8-4 with a 2.65 ERA. Even though results like that may lead Mariners to think they have the equivalent of the Tigers Verlander and Scherzer at the top of their rotation, Iwakuma isn’t nearly that good. He was aided by an insane 83% strand rate of runners that reached base (highest for all MLB starters – min 95 innings pitched), but his impressive skill-set does suggest another staff-mate of Hernandez who will deliver an ERA that starts with a “3” handle. Erasmo Ramirez, just 22 years-old last year, made 8 starts and was very impressive. There is no doubt Hernandez, Iwakuma and Ramirez could, one day, form a formidable starting rotation but asking the arms of the latter two to make the jump from 24 starts to 60+ and maintain the same level of effectiveness is a lot to ask in 2013.

Finally, the same optimism that surrounds the first three starters cannot be replicated for Blake Beavan (4.43 ERA in 2012, “supported” by a 10.5% strikeout rate – fifth worst among all MLB starters) and staff newcomer, the much-traveled Joe Saunders. Saunders returns to the AL West having never had particular success during his six seasons with the Angels.

For a number of seasons, the Mariners defense has been as critical to its run-suppression success as the pitcher-friendly confines of Safeco field. 2012 was no different as I had the Mariners matching the Angels for the most effective defense in baseball, a level of performance that added about three and one-half wins to the season-ending total compared to an average defense. In improving its offensive outlook, Seattle will almost certainly pay a partial tax for those extra runs on defense. Montero, whose prodigious offensive potential is crucial to their future success, is very lightly regarded as a catcher. He’s very young (just 23 in 2013) so that can change with experience but, like the addition of Morse, his presence in the field represents a very transparent effort by Seattle’s front office to trade some run suppression for run scoring in 2013.

Outsider enthusiasm for worst-to-first type success for the Mariners reminds me a lot of similar enthusiasm for the Royals last year. Unlike that misplaced optimism, if I squint, I can at least see how that could come to fruition for Seattle in 2013. The problem, more realistically though, is that the Mariners didn’t have any hidden areas of success in 2012 that would portend a regression-fueled surge in 2013. To paraphrase noted scholar Denny Green, the Mariners were exactly what we thought they were last year – a 75-win team. As a 75-win team they had considerable weaknesses and I don’t see enough corrections to get over the .500 level this year.

Truly wish-casting a Mariners post-season berth depends on at least two of either Montero, Ackley, or Smoak making the leap to All-Star level performer and, to be sure, that’s not impossible. Still, I see an offense that lacks any offensive table-setters to reward the additional power and offset a weakened defense. They may be sexy this year, but they’re still at least a year away from emerging as a credible threat to the trio of teams in their division better built for success in 2013.



Oddsmakers’ expectations: The Mariners total wins market opened at 78 ½ and I suspect the over is going to be a very popular bet in Las Vegas over the next five weeks. Like the Rangers, it certainly feels like Mariners market is low versus public expectations. (The other side of that balanced coin will emerge with the preview for the final AL West team, the Houston Astros.) I think Seattle’s market is spot on however, and wouldn’t be tempted with a flier on the over.


2013 Outlook:

78-84 – Fourth in AL West

644 Runs Scored 669 Runs Allowed

2013 Preview: Houston Astros


What They Did: 55-107, 6th Place NL West.

Actual Runs: Scored 583 runs, Allowed 794.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 58.7 (3.3 below actual)

Restated: Scored 605 runs, Allowed 783.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 62.3 (7.3 above actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Astros, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 62 games.)



Hanging (unspoken so far) over the previews for all teams in the AL West is the fact that there is a new member in their previously smallest-in-the-league fraternity. By moving the Houston Astros from the National League to the American League, MLB, from a fairness perspective, has eliminated two vexing disparities, one obvious and one hidden, that have existed for years. The obvious inequity was that a team in the NL Central had to finish ahead of five other teams to win its division and make the postseason while a team in the AL West only had to outplay three other teams. That problem has now been permanently eradicated.

Less obvious is a problem that I, following the lead of many analysts, wrote about last year. Teams in the same division, battling for a postseason berth, played meaningfully different schedules over the course of the season. In the NFL, the unbalanced schedule is transparent and, in the stated interest of year-over-year parity, celebrated. However, MLB’s scheduling was capricious and opaque and as a result, patently unfair. (In the most egregious example, NL Central teams didn’t even play their fellow division opponents the same amount of times.) Using the AL West as another example, take the Angels and the Rangers schedules last year. Thanks to playing the Dodgers instead of the Astros six times, plus two additional games against the Yankees and Orioles but two less games against the Indians and Red Sox and some other differences, Angels opponents had a winning percentage of nearly 2% more than Texas. Over 162 games, that equates to more than a 3-game advantage for Texas. The Rangers, of course, finished four games ahead of Los Angeles and if they swapped schedules, you’d have to assume the Angels would have been a Wild Card entrant, not the Rangers.

As a result of the Astros realignment, the scheduling imbalance across all of baseball largely disappears. MLB has reduced the interleague “rivalry” series from six games a year to four and, even better, matched intra-division schedules, almost, but not exactly. For instance, every AL West team plays 76 games against the AL West (19 against each team), 20 interleague games against the same opponents (with only a one team, four game exception), and identical schedules against the other two divisions in the AL, again with only minor, one game exceptions. It’s not perfect, but it’s much, much better.

For each of the last nine years the AL has outplayed its NL counterparts in interleague play – often in dominating fashion. Therefore, the thinking is, if the Astros lost 107 games in 2012 (and 106 in 2011) playing in the NL they’d have been a lock to lose at the barest minimum 110 games – and possibly many more – playing in the AL. In a piece I wrote last year examining the AL’s advantage over the last decade, (http://tradingbases.squarespace.com/blog/2012/6/29/why-the-nl-must-adopt-the-dh-for-its-own-good.html ) I discovered the AL had a mammoth advantage in games played in AL parks. In NL parks there was some evidence that the AL was the better league overall but it certainly wasn’t conclusive. In short, the AL’s superiority resulted from roster construction designed to reflect the need for a designated hitter. NL’s teams simply don’t prepare their rosters to have a competent DH for the nine games they play each year under AL rules. (More proof of this: they spent in 2012, on average, around $5 million less on payroll. Run production, after all, costs money.)

The Astros have addressed that deficiency, not by moving a back-up catcher to DH, as so many NL teams do in interleague play but by actually signing a competent DH in Carlos Pena. Pena is on the downside of his career, and his production with Tampa last year marked a six-year low (off a well-above-league-average base) but he’s still a competent addition to the Astros lineup. If he can maintain his on-base skills, (thanks to an elite batting eye – 5th in MLB in walk rate in 2012) and his power (25 HRs a year on average, last three years) – and those are two skills that are most-resistant to the aging curve – he will offset the Astros move to the AL.

I know that conclusion probably comes as a shock to readers so as long as you’re in that state of mind, let me toss a couple of other surprising facts at you as well:

The Astros, the 55-win Astros (!), tossed eleven shutouts in 2012, tied for 9th in the majors. The Tigers (with Verlander, Scherzer, et al) had eight. The 86-win Nationals (Gonzalez, Strasburg, etc.) had nine. The previous year, the Astros had just six.
In 135 less plate appearances than in 2011, the 2012 Astros hit 51 more home runs – and somehow scored 32 less runs.
In 2012, the Astros and the Mariners were the lowest scoring teams in each league. The Astros had a higher batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage (without a DH, mind you) but somehow scored 36 less runs than the Mariners.
The Astros started the year 22-23 and finished it 15-15. Those wins weren’t fluky either, as Houston outscored its opponents by five runs over those two strings totaling 75 games, or nearly half the season.

That last bullet point reeks of “selective endpoint” sampling. But I’ve taken a look at the six other 100-loss teams since 2008 and, while not unprecedented (Seattle in 2010 had three separate, non-consecutive months where they essentially played .500 baseball) it is unusual for a team that bad to play league-average baseball for such an extended period of time.

It’s obvious I’m implying Houston, unlike 2011, wasn’t as bad as its record in 2012 might lead fans to think. To help me support that premise, I even have an area of hidden strength for you and it’ll be familiar to anyone who read the Oakland A’s preview: Houston’s defense, 18th in the majors with a 70.4% efficiency when starters were on the mound, was the worst in baseball (67.3%) when its relievers were in the game. The smaller sample size nature of the latter observation suggests Houston’s true level of defensive efficiency is closer to league-average overall – which could save about 50 runs in high-leverage situations this year. That’s a big contributing factor as to why I’ve got Houston allowing less runs in 2013 than in 2012 despite the move to the higher-scoring league.

Even better news is that lineup changes for Houston this year strengthens the team significantly and replaces the weakest fielders – the outfielders – from the 2012 squad. I’m a big fan of Tyler Greene who shined (7 HRs, .460 SLG) in his month-and-a-half with Houston after he was the victim of a crowded middle infield in St. Louis. He’s an attractive last-round fantasy pick if you want to hold off drafting a shortstop. The emergence of exciting corner outfielders and first basemen in Oakland made Chris Carter another casualty of an organizational numbers game and Houston is the beneficiary here as well. Carter is a very patient hitter with loads of power (.864 OPS in 2012) right out of the Moneyball mode. He’ll represent a massive upgrade over the production of last year’s corner outfielders J.D. Martinez and Brian Bogusevic and their respective .685 and .596 OPS. Fernando Martinez, off a promising 130 plate appearances last year (.766 OPS) should upgrade the other side of the outfield. Finally, but by no means least importantly, the Astros released their anemic-hitting centerfielder from last year, Jordan Schafer who actually had a slugging percentage (.294) lower than his on-base percentage (.297). Justin Maxwell will provide the upgrade.

If you’re trying to finish .500, let alone compete for a postseason berth the Astros starting rotation would be a big problem, but it does not look 100-loss bad to me. That’s especially true because Erik Bedard and Phil Humber will replace Dallas Keuchel, who sported a deadly K/BB ratio below 1, and a combination of other year-end spot starters with 5.00+ ERAs. Bedard and Humber represent considerable upgrades.


Curb your pessimism this year though because even after moving to the AL, that’s not the case in 2013.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: While it may seem incongruent, the Astros are, by a comfortable margin, the team most likely to finish in last place in the majors and yet still offer considerable value to anyone backing them in the futures market. That’s because the Astros total wins opened at 60 wins, and based on early comments I’ve read out of Vegas, the under is a very popular bet. That suggests the number will drop. I, on the other hand, enthusiastically back betting the over especially if the market drops into the 50s.

2013 Outlook:

66-96 – Fifth in AL West

635 Runs Scored 778 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: TAMPA BAY RAYS

What They Did: 90-72, 3rd Place AL East.

Actual Runs: Scored 697 runs, Allowed 577.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 94.9 (4.9 above actual)

Restated: Scored 685 runs, Allowed 554.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 96.5 (6.5 above actual)

(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Rays, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 97 games.)



After reviewing the 2011 season, the Boston Red Sox were the unluckiest team in the major leagues. Not because they tasted improbable defeat in game 162 resulting in a missed postseason berth, but because they were even in a position to blow an all-but-certain playoff berth in historic fashion. The beneficiaries of that bad luck were, of course, the Tampa Bay Rays.

So perhaps it’s evidence of a universe in balance that, in 2012, the Rays were the unluckiest team in Major League Baseball.

Tampa outscored its opponents by 120 runs and missed the playoffs. Since 2005, only two teams – the 2008 Toronto Blue Jays (+104) and the 2011 Boston Red Sox (+138) – outscored its opponents by more than 100 runs and missed the postseason. But, we’re now in the era of two Wild Card teams. Boston would have made the playoffs in 2011 under that arrangement. Believe it or not, it’s actually a little bit worse than it seems. Tampa Bay may have been unlucky at converting its runs scored and runs allowed into wins, but there were also unlucky that the spread between the two wasn’t even higher. That’s because, their pitching and defense was even better than the major league-low 577 runs they allowed. That’s right: Despite playing in the higher-scoring American League, the Rays allowed the fewest runs in all of baseball – and that figure should have been even lower.

Take a look at this comparison of two pitching staffs of recent vintage. Note that these selected stats reflect the opponent’s performance against each respective staff:

Batting Avg. On-Base % Slugging % Isolated Power

Team A .240 .296 .361 .121

Team B .228 .294 .352 .124

(Quick definition: Isolated Power, or ISO, is a measure of total extra base hits per at bat. Essentially it strips out the effect singles contribute to slugging percentage. Algebraically, it’s simply slugging percentage minus batting average. It’s a great measure of a team’s home-run hitting ability, the most important factor in slugging percentage.)

Although both pitching staffs were truly outstanding (on-base percentages that low means each pitching staff essentially turned all of its opponents into the 2012 version of the Seattle Mariners) it’s also clear that, with one exception, Team B’s pitching staff is a little better than Team A’s. That one exception is home runs allowed – as evidenced by the ISO against – and even that has the residue of bad luck attached to it. Team A allowed more fly balls, by a material amount, played in a home park much more conducive to allowing homers (as we’ll see in a minute) and still allowed fewer homers. Team B allowed far fewer doubles and triples, even if you convert those excess homeruns to doubles and triples, hence the materially lower slugging percentage against.

So, knowing all that, you’d expect Team A to have allowed more runs than Team B. In fact, a regression analysis, based on a decade of results, predicts Team A should have allowed more runs than Team B by 26 runs.

Team A, the dominant Philadelphia Phillies pitching staff of 2011, actually allowed 48 runs less than Team B, last year’s Tampa Bay Rays. But as bad as that result is, when you dig a little deeper it’s more eye-opening. That’s because runs allowed is a counting stat, as opposed to a rate stat, which means the more opportunities a team gets to bat, the more runs it will generate. When you then factor in that Philadelphia faced 69 more batters (about two games worth) the disparity gets a little worse. With such a dominant performance on the mound and in the field, Tampa should have cruised to a division title. (As reflected in the Restated Results, above.)

Don’t hang your heads too far Rays fans; the good news is I think you’re going to cruise to the best record in the division this year, and possibly end up with the best record in the American League in the process.

Due to their payroll constraints, their effective use of one-year contracts, and natural attrition that results in the partial turnover of every team’s roster from year to year, fans have become accustomed to large changes in the Rays players each year. That’s not true this year. Tampa has only one meaningful change to its league-leading pitching corps and although it’s a big one, I think it’s very manageable. During the off-season, James Shields was traded to Kansas City for Wil Myers, generally regarded as the best hitting prospect in the minor leagues. (There were other players involved too, but the trade boiled down to Shields for Myers.) My model loves James Shields. I come squarely down in the camp that he is absolutely a staff ace, unlike some who are pillorying the Royals for the trade. (I too don’t like the trade, because of salary commitments though, not because Shields won’t contribute more to a team’s success than Myers.)

Here’s the thing about Shields though, especially as we look at marginal changes from the 2012 season. While his skill set was once again top-tier (K/BB ratio of 3.84, 12th among all MLB starters – and better than David Price’s 3.47, incidentally – accompanied by the highest velocity of his career) his results were not. Oh sure, his 3.52 ERA looks impressive but those are only earned runs, not total runs. Shields RA was 4.07 due to his league-leading 14 unearned runs allowed. Jeff Niemann, who will be replacing Shields in the rotation, is not and never will be as good as Shields. He does not have the potential to throw a complete game shutout every outing, as Shields does. However, in over 500 innings as a Rays starter from 2009-2011, Niemann posted a 4.31 RA. During an injury-shortened 2012, he made eight starts and at 4.03, bettered Shields RA.

As this deep dive into the numbers shows, it’s quite possible there will be just a minor increase in total runs allowed due to the departure of Shields. Factor in some bullpen regression (although the Rays’ American League-leading bullpen ERA is entirely supported by peripheral statistics, in contrast to runners-up Oakland and Baltimore) and a possible regression from the other starters, but not guaranteed due to the age of still peaking twenty-somethings David Price, Jeremy Hellickson, Alex Cobb and Matt Moore, and it seems as if I’m calling for the worst case scenario when I say this: Even if bullpen regression, a step-backwards from Price et al, and replacing Shields with Niemann costs the Rays 50 runs in performance, thanks to the “bad luck” they experienced in 2012, it will only result in 27 more runs allowed and the Rays will still give up fewer runs than any other team in the American League.

On the run scoring side of the ledger, I have extreme confidence the Rays are going to score more runs this year. Their best hitter, Evan Longoria, only played 74 games last year and I am torn between naming him or Yoenis Cespedes as my AL MVP choice for 2013. Desmond Jennings experienced the dreaded, but common, sophomore-slump last year and missed 30 games from an early-season injury that may have sapped his performance all year. I love him as an underrated fantasy pick. He’ll move to center field this year to replace the departed B.J. Upton, but a healthy Matt Joyce in left field should make up for the loss of Upton. First baseman James Loney and shortstop Yunel Escobar may not excite fantasy players but it would be hard for them not to improve, respectively, on the production Carlos Pena and Elliot Johnson supplied last year.

On Loney, there is considerable evidence that while his bat put the Dodgers in a comparative hole versus other teams thanks to the premium offensive production needed at first base, Dodger Stadium was the main cause of his problems. Loney has slugged a very respectable .462 away from home (the average first baseman slugged .442 in 2012) but just .375 at home. So over 1,700 plate appearances both home and away, Loney hit like an above-average first baseman on the road but a below-average shortstop at Dodger Stadium. Obviously, the Rays are hoping an escape from the dead air in Chavez Ravine helps Loney’s overall performance.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: The Tampa Bay Rays have won 90 or more games in four of the last five years, averaging nearly 92 wins during that span. Last year, as I’ve shown above, may have been their best team of the bunch. This year’s squad will be better offensively and although the skill set of James Shields cannot be replaced, it’s quite possible his results can be. By the end of preview series, Tampa may emerge as my choice for the AL pennant. Las Vegas has opened their 2013 total wins market at 85 ½ wins. This is my favorite over on the entire board.

2013 Outlook:

93-69 – First in AL East

714 Runs Scored 604 Runs Allowed

2013 Preview: New York Yankees

What They Did: 95-67, 1st Place AL East. Lost 4-0 in ALCS.

Actual Runs: Scored 804 runs, Allowed 668.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 94.0 (1.0 below actual)

Restated: Scored 842 runs, Allowed 698.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 94.8 (0.2 below actual)

(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Yankees, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 95 games.)



Boy, I haven’t seen this much grave dancing since Seal Team Six accomplished its mission. Just about everyone is throwing dirt on the 2013 prospects of the New York Yankees with most accounts citing the decline of the Yankees lineup. On ESPN.com, Andrew Marchand opined it’s the worst Yankees lineup since 1991. C’mon. First of all, let’s consider the baseline. If I look at the SI Swimsuit Issue and tell you that’s the worst Kate Upton has looked since 2010, I’m not really saying much, am I?

Injuries to Alex Rodriguez (out of the lineup until at least July) Curtis Granderson (probably sidelined through May) and Derek Jeter (questionable for the start of the season) may have robbed the Yankees of a portion of their 2012 firepower but let’s be clear: No one is going to be calling, “Pat Kelly, Mel Hall . . C’mon down!”

Once again it’s helpful to look at starting points and marginal changes. The Yankees scored 804 runs last year, second in the league behind the Texas Rangers. A sharp-eyed reader may note that in the Angels preview I mentioned that on a park-adjusted basis the Angels were the highest-scoring team in baseball. That’s correct and on that basis the Yankees (park factor of 1.03) were third with the St. Louis Cardinals second. However, although they weren’t the highest scoring team, the Yankees, by far, had the best offense in baseball last year. While they were seventh in batting average, they augmented that with league-high slugging, isolated power, and were second in on-base percentage. So why didn’t they score the most runs? Once again it comes down to the variability of “cluster luck”.

If you’re a Yankees fan, think back to last summer. What was the one thing that had commentators, talk radio, and fans gnashing their teeth about? The Yankees inability to hit with the bases loaded. Overall the Yankees hit .265/.337/.453. With the bases loaded and one or two out – high leverage situations for either scoring runs or not – they hit .228/.276/.465. That’s the very definition of non-repeatable, small-sample size variance, or as I call it cluster luck. Overall, it cost the Yankees 38 runs of expected production compared to their actual performance (see restated runs, above.)

Why is that significant? Because it means if the Yankees lose the services of A-Rod (2012 fWAR of 2.2) for half the season and Granderson (fWAR of 2.6) for a third and Derek Jeter (fWAR of 3.2) is only half as effective in 2013 as he was for the entire year in 2012, and if A-Rod’s and Granderson’s fill-ins are no better than replacement level, -- as long as the rest of the team simply performs at an average rate with the bases loaded -- then the Yankees will score 800 runs this year. And that, unlike the 1991 Yankees, will quite possibly lead the league. (Note: 1 WAR = 10 runs. A-Rod drop = -1.1, Granderson -.9, Jeter -1.6 = -3.6 WAR or -36 runs, nearly the same as they underperformed in 2012.)

Veterans of the financial industry, and anyone who has ever managed their own stock portfolio, know this basic fact: A single stock is far more volatile than a portfolio comprised of a number of stocks. That’s important because even with the injury headlines and the normal Yankees melodrama, it’s far, far, FAR more likely the Yankees will again score 800+ runs this year than it is that Mike Trout will be as productive in 2013 as last year. The Yankees lineup in 2012 featured nine regulars who were better than league-average hitters even adjusted for the park they played in. The only exception, Russell Martin, is gone and the only other player even close to league average, Raul Ibanez is also gone. Eric Chavez is the third notable departure.

Brett Gardner (6.2 WAR in 2010, 5.2 in 2011) only had 37 plate appearances last year. He will replace, and undoubtedly improve upon Ibanez’s production. It’s hard to believe Chavez, at 34, performed at a level that would be hard to replace but with an .845 OPS he did. Still, the Yankees are the Yankees and they tabbed the perpetually underrated (although, oft-injured) Travis Hafner to fill the DH role. Even though Martin was merely adequate as a hitting catcher, it’s a fact that Chris Stewart figures to be worse. This is a true hole in the Yankees line up and while it may be a new experience for the Bronx Bombers, it hardly puts them at a competitive disadvantage.

I’ve got the Yankees scoring less than 800 runs below because I’m assuming Kevin Youkilis and Juan Rivera, in tandem, perform at a mere replacement level filling in for the injured A-Rod and Granderson. I also respect the projections that must incorporate some regression for Robinson Cano and the age of the line-up means an above-average amount of injury time must also be assumed. All that considered, this offense is still well above league average and stating otherwise is the emotion-driven product of wish-casting failure upon a hated entity.

The starting rotation loses only Freddy Garcia and his 17 starts of 5.93 ERA baseball. (He was far more effective out of the bullpen, but those starts look pretty easy to replace.) Those starts will be made up by either Andy Pettitie or David Phelps. In the bullpen, Mariano Rivera returns and I’d like to think there isn’t a Yankee-hater out there who isn’t at least a little happy about that development. New York hopes his surgically-repaired knee won’t interfere with his ability to replicate the 2.26 ERA his replacement, the free-agent departed Rafael Soriano, posted in the closer’s role.

The entire pitching staff is stable and, with the exception of Sabathia and Rivera unassuming. That’s fine as the starters posted a 6th-in-the-American League ERA of 4.05 and the bullpen was 7th best at preventing runs. Overall, both units had peripherals that suggested better skill sets than their actual results. Again, even if there is some age-related regression this year, that gives the Yankees hurlers some cushion to absorb it without allowing any more runs.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: It should be noted that the tone of the pessimism (aging core, injuries to key players, improved division opponents) surrounding the Yankees this spring is practically identical to the gloom-and-doom chatter that surround the five-time NL East champion Phillies last year. Therefore, it must be acknowledged, the naysayers were better at seeing around the corner than the model-based projections were. Without question, that’s relevant to the Yankees discussion.


Edited by me.... This below this mark is MY Personal belief of this season, not the article because the person who wrote this from his blog likes the yankees to win 89 games so with my edit here it will now read.......

The Yankees market opened at 87 ½ wins.. we know around here at Thinkdog that .... THAT ISN'T HAPPENING!!!

Ej's 2013 Outlook:

84-78 – Third in AL East

750 Runs Scored 689 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: BOSTON RED SOX

What They Did: 69-93, 5th Place AL East.

Actual Runs: Scored 734 runs, Allowed 806.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 74.1 (5.1 below actual)

Restated: Scored 703 runs, Allowed 771.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 74.2 (5.2 below actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Red Sox, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 74 games.)



An underrated aspect of a team’s success or failure each year is the stability of its roster. In 2012 Boston had 21 different players make at least 100 plate appearances – and a 22nd player, Darnell McDonald, made 99. 2012 was also the first year since 2001 (when Joe Kerrigan finished the year as manager) that the Sawx didn’t score at least 800 runs, breaking their league-leading streak of 10 years in a row. (The Yankees now have the longest streak at 4 seasons.) During that ten-year stretch, the Red Sox averaged 15 players with a minimum of 100 plate appearances, with a high of just 17 players. You simply cannot have an above-average, let alone elite offense when Darnell McDonald, Ryan Kalish, Marlon Byrd, Mauro Gomez, and Ryan Lavarnway are all playing substantial amounts of time.

There are a lot of new faces in the 2013 Red Sox lineup but they are markedly better than the players they are replacing in terms of plate appearances. Mike Napoli, Shane Victorino, Stephen Drew, Jonny Gomes, and David Ross (who I love incidentally, but because he’s going to platoon, at least initially with Jarrod Saltalamacchia, he’s not a draftable commodity for fantasy baseball) are upgrades easily capable of lifting the Red Sox back to the 800-run level on offense. Plus, Jacoby Ellsbury, whose season was marred by a shoulder injury, had the worst year of his career in the 323 plate appearances he did make. At age 29, it’s highly probably he’ll have a much more productive year in 2013.

With improved health, the Red Sox can get to 800 runs on offense which means one-half of their run differential equation can be playoff caliber. What about run prevention? Thanks to the highly visible problems Boston had with the closer’s role last year, most notably Alfredo Aceves’ 2-10 record, 8 blown saves, and a 5.36 ERA that accompanied his 25 saves, it will come as no surprise to Red Sox Nation that Boston had the fourth worst bullpen in the AL last year. New closer Joel Hanrahan along with a healthy Andrew Bailey front a bullpen that will surely improve on last year’s crew which allowed more than 4 runs for every nine innings pitched.

The problem for Boston is its starting rotation. Lester, Buchholz, Dempster, Doubront, and Lackey is a serviceable rotation, but truthfully it looks more like a collection of #3 starters than anything that resembles an ace-anchored staff. Jon Lester was awful last year and, unlike Jacoby Ellsbury, he’s not necessarily a candidate for a bounceback year because his pedestrian peripheral skills, especially his strikeout rate, not only caught up with him, they even got a little worse. This is not the “ace” you want facing Sabathia, Verlander, Darvish, et al.

You can more or less write a variation on that last sentence for the entire staff. Ryan Dempster will probably end up the “ace” in that he will allow the least amount of runs but outside of Felix Doubront, no one has the coveted “upside” that could lead to a career year. It’s the rotation that will most likely prevent the Red Sox from making a return to the post season.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: The Red Sox market is interesting in that their opening total wins market of 82 ½ is 13 ½ wins higher than last year’s win total of 69 games. Only Toronto’s spread is higher (by one game) and, of course, they made many notable offseason upgrades to their roster. I don’t believe the Red Sox market is the result of thoughtful analysis on the bookmaker’s part. I believe, like betting on Notre Dame in NCAA football games or the Cowboys in NFL games, there is a silly premium – much like buying an Hermes scarf – that reflects the public’s obsession with the team. There is a path to the playoffs for the Red Sox, (it involves a lot of runs scored and competent performances from all five members of the starting rotation) and I don’t think it’s that far-fetched. But you should be getting paid a much better price to back that position. There is no value to making that call at these levels.

2013 Outlook:

83-79 – Third in AL East

778 Runs Scored 754 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: TORONTO BLUE JAYS

What They Did: 73-89, 4th Place AL East.

Actual Runs: Scored 716 runs, Allowed 784.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 74.3 (1.3 above actual)

Restated: Scored 677 runs, Allowed 811.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 67.8 (5.2 below actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Blue Jays, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 68 games.)



The Blue Jays and Red Sox were essentially mirror images of each other last year. Boston played like a 74-win team that actually won 69 games and Toronto won 73 games but complied offensive and defensive statistics that would most likely result in 68 wins. While anecdotal, it also points out a problem for a Blue Jays team which made major changes to its roster during the offseason: In evaluating these marginal changes, it must be noted Toronto was starting from a worst point than it appeared but I don’t think the front office knows that.

Make no mistake about it, Toronto is going to be better this year on both sides of the ledger. On offense, the changes are straightforward and marginally positive. Melky Cabrera will replace Rajai Davis who moves to a backup outfielder role. Jose Reyes takes over at shortstop in place of the departed Yunel Escobar and the new second baseman is Emilio Bonifacio replacing Kelly Johnson. Unlike the changes on some teams, the Blue Jays have replaced weak performers. Of the ten players on last year’s team who had at least 350 plate appearances, the Blue Jays have replaced three of the four players who were furthest below league average in creating runs at their position. (The fourth, Colby Rasmus, remains the starting center fielder.) While no one should expect any improvement from the addition of Bonifacio, Reyes and Cabrera will certainly provide offensive upgrades. The problem for Toronto then is how much improvement will Reyes and Cabrera provide and can they get improvement anywhere else?

After adjusting for park factors, Toronto had the fourth worst offense in the American League. The possibility of another 200 plate appearances from Jose Bautista, who only appeared in 92 games in 2012, could help as could natural aging curve improvement from under-28 year-olds Brett Lawrie, Colby Rasmus, and J.P. Arencibia. However, regression from Edwin Encarnacion’s career year would most likely eat into some, if not the majority of any improvement from returning players. Thanks to the presence of Reyes and Cabrera, Toronto will score more runs this year and the projection below incorporates that. 740 runs scored reflects 63 additional runs or roughly, 3 more wins each from Reyes and Cabrera. However the Blue Jays were 11th in the AL in batting average last year, and a next-to-last 13th in on-base percentage. They’ll be better and there’s some room for upside from the projection but to my eye there is not nearly enough improvement to foresee Toronto possessing a playoff-caliber offense.

Of course, you can get to the playoffs riding your pitching staff as well, and Toronto has made significant upgrades there as well. In fact, the improvement in runs allowed projects to be significantly bigger than the runs scored improvement. NL Cy Young Award winner, R.A. Dickey comes to Toronto in a trade and while the idea that he is a one-year wonder is overstated, the truth is he did have a career year last year at age 37 and he’s moving to a tougher league. Josh Johnson and Mark Buehrle, both acquired from Miami, could offer significant upgrades from a staff that had five different starters with ERAs above 4.50 in 2012. But beyond Dickey and last year’s legitimate ace Brandon Morrow there are definite questions about how much production Johnson, Buehrle, and Ricky Romero can give the Blue Jays.

No bullpen in the AL had an ERA above 4.00 last year except Toronto whose pen sported an alarming 4.33 ERA. Due to the volatile nature of bullpens from year to year (often because teams can replace bullpen parts so easily, which is exactly what Toronto did) the Blue Jays project to have the biggest improvement in its bullpen across the American League. However, the changes to the starting lineup almost certainly makes the team worse in the field and that will cost some runs – and could be an especially acute problem for Mark Buehrle who is entirely dependent on the defense behind him to keep runs off the board.

Toronto will be much more competitive this year and for the first time in a while won’t necessarily need to win high-scoring affairs to amass victories. While there is undeniable improvement, Toronto is starting from too big a talent gap to suddenly become playoff contenders – even if the additions are very high profile.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: It’s those high profile additions that have made Toronto a darling of the oddsmakers this year. Their opening total wins market of 87 ½ sits just one game beneath the Yankees. With the pre-season injuries to Curtis Granderson and now, Mark Texeria, I wouldn’t be the least bit surprised to see Toronto to actually have a higher market by the time the season is ready to begin. This is my favorite under in the American League.

2013 Outlook:

82-80 – Fourth in AL East

740 Runs Scored 727 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: BALTIMORE ORIOLES

What They Did: 93-69, 2nd Place AL East. Lost in ALDS, 3-2

Actual Runs: Scored 712 runs, Allowed 705.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 81.7 (11.3 below actual)

Restated: Scored 710 runs, Allowed 701.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 82.0 (11.0 below actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Orioles, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 82 games.)



The best way to start the Baltimore Orioles preview is to acknowledge two things:

There were two teams whose success in 2012 came as a stunning surprise, the Orioles and the A’s. While I may like to tout the fact that my model identified the A’s as no fluke, it never embraced the success of the Orioles.
While on the surface, the O’s, by virtue of barely outscoring its opponents over the course of the regular season, appear to have been one of the least deserving teams to capture a post-season berth in recent memory, that’s not entirely the case.
To be sure, the Orioles 2012 roadmap to the playoffs is not a repeatable endeavor. Specifically they Orioles went 16-2 in extra-inning games. No team that has played at least 18 extra-inning games in a year – and there have been 272 since 1969 – has ever won a higher percentage of those games than the 89% that Baltimore did. (The 1999 Braves, 17-5 in extra-inning games, were second best at 77%.) In fact, only four teams since division play began in 1969, out of nearly 1,200 team seasons, have won a higher percentage of extra-inning games no matter how few they played. Despite that, overcoming their pedestrian run differential to become a playoff team reveals a little more finesse by the Orioles front office, and less luck, than they have been given credit for.

After 100 games, or roughly at the MLB trading deadline, the Orioles had been outscored by a whopping 58 runs, the third-worst differential in the American League. Despite that, they were in second place in the AL East with a 52-48 record and just 2 games back in the Wild Card race. In an understanding of game theory reminiscent of the brilliant Princeton basketball coach Pete Carril, Baltimore’s front office understood that although they may have had zero business being in position to battle for a post-season berth, they also knew that a) they had banked those wins and would never have to give them back no matter how undeserved and b) they had just shortened the season to 62 games. So they went out and significantly improved the team by acquiring Jim Thome, Nate McLouth, and, via a minor-league promotion, Manny Machado. McLouth and Machado essentially played 4.0 WAR baseball prorated over those last 60 games, matching the production of Orioles’ stars Adam Jones and Matt Wieters.

They did the same thing with the pitching staff acquiring Joe Saunders and promoting Chris Tillman and Miguel Gonzalez to the starting rotation. All of those moves paid off handsomely and over the last 62 games of the season the Orioles went a deserved 41-21 considering they outscored their opponents by 65 runs in those games – 2nd best in the American League and 3rd best in all of baseball. That last-third-of-the-season success was masked in the standings by what happened in the first 100 games and it should erase the storyline that the team the Orioles fielded at the time the playoffs began had no business being there. Over the last third of the season, it was a brilliantly executed plan, accompanied by a legitimate playoff-caliber performance.

The question for 2013 is if any of those performances can be repeated? By projecting Baltimore to finish in 5th place in the AL East, my answer is a resounding no.

The problem is pitching. Baltimore’s pitching staff was league average, 7th in the AL in runs allowed. The four starters with the best ERAs are returning this year and the emerging ace Jason Hammel is a solid anchor. Wei-Yin Chen’s 4.02 ERA was just better than the average AL starter and based on his skill sets, that’s a reasonable expectation of 2013 production as well. It’s the next three starters that pose a problem. Chris Tillman (2.93 ERA in 15 starts) and Miguel Gonzalez (3.25 in 15 starts) had All-Star caliber results in the half-season’s worth of games they pitched. The problem with expecting that type of performance in 2013 is that they don’t have All-Star skills. Gonzalez is an extreme flyball pitcher, in a hitter’s park, with a below-average strikeout rate and an above-average walk rate. He is simply a 5.00 ERA waiting to happen. Tillman is also an extreme flyball pitcher with otherwise average skills. While that doesn’t make him a 5.00 ERA candidate, it does mean he’s at least a low 4.00 ERA pitcher and, like Gonzalez, means his ERA should jump at least 1.25 during the year. Add to that big increase in runs allowed form the starting rotation the fact that Jair Jurrjens (another 5.00 ERA candidate with a 6.89 ERA last year in Atlanta) is currently slated to be the fifth starter and you’ve got a substantial increase in runs allowed with little room for suppression improvement elsewhere on the staff or the bullpen.

On offense, there aren’t many changes. Mark Reynolds is gone and while that means his very low batting average (.221) will be easy to replace, his excellent batting eye (9th highest walk rate among MLB regulars) and power (.429 slugging) won’t be. Just about the very best Baltimore can expect is for Wilson Betemit to match those numbers. Otherwise the lineup is very stable. Brian Roberts is the only member of the starting lineup more than 31 years old with Matt Weiters and Adam Jones entering the prime of their careers. Jones is capable of morphing into an MVP candidate this year and Baltimore will need that if they hope to be in a second-half pennant race again. But it doesn’t look like the offense has a higher ceiling than mildly above-average.

They Orioles were masterful at doing everything they had to, on and off the field, to maximize their production last year. It was a fun story and the city of Baltimore enjoyed October baseball for the first time since the 1990s. But with the Red Sox and the Blue Jays – the two teams Baltimore beat up on most in 2012 going 24-12 against them – certain to be better this year, it just doesn’t add up that Baltimore could get the same type of results out of its talent base in 2013.


Oddsmakers’ expectations: While everyone expects Baltimore to regress this year, my outlook is even a little harsher than the oddsmakers’. The Orioles total wins market opened at 77 ½ and even though I’m lower there’s not enough of a difference to recommend making an investment on the under.

2013 Outlook:

76-86 – Fifth in AL East

698 Runs Scored 747 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: DETROIT TIGERS

What They Did: 88-74, 1st Place AL Central. Lost in World Series, 4-0

Actual Runs: Scored 726 runs, Allowed 670.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 86.9 (1.1 below actual)

Restated: Scored 751 runs, Allowed 668.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 89.6 (1.6 above actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Tigers, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 90 games.)



The fans and front office management of the Cleveland Indians and the Chicago White Sox, and maybe even if they want to dabble in a bit of delusion, the Kansas City Royals must feel an awful lot like the villain in a James Bond movie. Last year, they had the Tigers wounded and vulnerable; they had their chance to take out Detroit but they let them get away. Entering 2013 the Tigers are healed, recovered, and in control of a gadget-filled, sleek offensive machine and a third-straight division title looks far more likely this spring than defending their 2011 crown looked a year ago.

Last year the Tigers were coming off a 95-win season in 2011 and faced several challenges in replicating that performance in 2012. Alex Avila and Jhonny Peralta were coming off of career years and seemed certain to regress, and while defending AL Cy Young and MVP winner Justin Verlander and defending batting champ Miguel Cabrera sported skill sets that didn’t necessarily demand regression there was very little room for improvement. Prince Fielder had been added to the lineup but his signing resulted from the loss of Victor Martinez to an off-season injury and who was coming off an extremely productive in 2011. Throw in the prospect of a horrendous defense and the Tigers looked vulnerable.

Virtually every one of those projections played out as expected; Verlander and Cabrera, as good as they were in 2012, essentially matched their 2011 performances. Fielder was even a little better than Martinez was in 2011 but the defense was horrendous and other than Austin Jackson, no one else in the lineup provided the offense with an above-average performance. As a result, with a week to go in the season, the Tigers were alone in first place for just the fourth day of the season since April.

That shouldn’t happen this year. The Tigers are adding a recovered Victor Martinez and defensive wizard Torii Hunter to replace more than 1,100 below-replacement level plate appearances from Delmon Young and Brennan Boesch. Among players with at least 500 plate appearances, according to FanGraphs WAR, Young and Boesch were two of the six worst players in baseball last year. Add in a full season of starts from Omar Infante and Andy Dirks, and the Tigers will be replacing other value-destroying “contributions” from Don Kelly, Ramon Santiago, and Danny Worth. Consider this table which demonstrates just how much room for offensive improvement the Tigers have available:

Plate Appearances by

Batters W/ Negative fWAR Total Negative fWAR

Astros 1,495 -2.2

Twins 961 -2.8

Tigers 1,893 -5.6

The Tigers won the AL pennant despite having more negative contributions from its everyday players than the worst team in either the National or American League. Move over Boston, New York, and Texas – for the first time since the 2001 season, one of those three teams won’t lead the league in runs scored; the Detroit Tigers will be MLB’s highest scoring team in 2013.

Even though the Tigers rotation features Justin Verlander (ERA below 3.00, two years running) and Max Scherzer, whose 29.4% strikeout rate was 4% higher than third-best Clayton Kershaw – a bigger spread than Kershaw’s gap over the 26th ranked best strikeout pitcher – there is still room for improvement compared to last year’s performance. Detroit’s starters had the 8th best ERA in the majors at 3.76, but based on a regression of their underlying skill sets (strikeout, walk, and groundball rates) they had the 2nd lowest expected ERA of 3.58. The same is true of its bullpen (3.79 actual vs. 3.57 expected.) To achieve an improvement in run prevention, and therefore to be a threat to win 100 games, the Tigers will need two things two happen: 1) Good health from the starting rotation and 2) An improved defense.

The Tigers got 28 starts in 2012 from pitchers not in this year’s starting rotation and during those starts gave up 85 runs in 133 1/3 innings (5.74 RA). If they get 150 starts from this year’s rotation of Verlander, Scherzer, Doug Fister, Anibal Sanchez, and Rick Porcello it’s likely their runs allowed will decrease.

As far as defense goes, last year the addition of Prince Fielder to the infield in combination with Miguel Cabrera’s return to full-time third base duties for the first time since 2007, figured to saddle Detroit with one of the worst defenses in baseball. That’s essentially what happened as the Tigers trailed only Kansas City in my calculations of American League defensive effectiveness. Compare the Tigers to their nearest competitors in the AL Central, the Chicago White Sox:

Resulting Adjusted

Balls hit into Play Baserunners DP/CS/Kills Baserunners

Tigers 4,096 1,311 201 1,110

White Sox 4,095 1,216 235 980

That table explains why the White Sox had a chance to steal the division last year. Despite having exactly the same amount of balls hit to their fielders, the Tigers allowed an extra 130 batters to reach base. The difference in defense cost Detroit at least 60 runs and somewhere close to 6 or 7 wins compared to the White Sox. The Tigers aren’t going to change that completely – they probably won’t even be an average defensive team – but they can improve based solely on the addition of Torii Hunter. Here’s why: The Tigers faced a higher percentage of left-handed batters than any other team in baseball and its pitchers allowed the seventh highest rate of fly balls. Think about what that means for a right fielder. Across all of baseball, each team’s average right fielder caught 312 fly balls. Tigers right fielders – blessed with the advantage of above-average fly balls and facing the most left handed hitters in baseball – caught an MLB worst 254 fly balls. Torii Hunter may be 37 years old, but he’s a 9-time gold glove winner and he will undoubtedly be the primary reason the Tigers defense will be marginally more effective in 2013.

As the Tigers showed in the AL playoffs last year, if they play just average defense they are a tough team to beat. With an improved offense in 2013, a better closer, and if the rotation is healthy, I can see the Tigers winning 100 games. They may have needed to get hot during the last two weeks of the 2012 season to win 88 games and make the playoffs, but this year there’s a better chance they’ll win 100 games than finish at .500 with 81 wins. Thanks to the division they play in, the Tigers have a better chance of making the playoffs than any other MLB team.



Oddsmakers’ expectations: Last year the Tigers had a total wins market of 93 games and I led-off my preview series with them because I felt it was one of the easiest under bets on the board. This year Detroit has opened at the familiar 93-game level but the outlook is different. I’ve got the Tigers with the best record in the American League. It’s not quite enough of a cushion to recommend taking the over but I’d stay far away from the under. Even though I’ll take Tampa as my AL World Series pick, the Tigers have a better chance of winning 100 games than anyone else in the majors.


2013 Outlook:

95-67 – First in AL Central

813 Runs Scored 673 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: CLEVELAND INDIANS


What They Did: 68-94, 4th Place AL Central.

Actual Runs: Scored 667 runs, Allowed 845.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 63.7 (4.3 below actual)

Restated: Scored 682 runs, Allowed 793.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 69.9 (1.9 above actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Indians, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 70 games.)



In the previews of a pair of AL East teams, it was mentioned that observer expectations for improvement in 2013 were highest for the Boston Red Sox and the Toronto Blue Jays. The Red Sox, who had the third-worst record in the AL League last year were ravaged with injuries and had a horrendous closer, have addressed those issues with new personnel. Big improvement is thus expected. The Toronto Blue Jays, who won 73 games in 2012 (four more than Boston) also acquired new personnel but did it in a much flashier manner than the Red Sox and as a result, expectations for improvement are even higher in Toronto than Boston. Vegas established an opening market for Boston’s and Toronto’s total wins 13 ½ and 14 ½ wins higher for 2013 than their 2012 totals respectively. Those levels represent, by far, the highest expectations for improvement in the American League. In the National League, only the Cubs are expected to have a double-digit win improvement.

Despite the expectations reflected in those markets, Cleveland could just as well have the biggest improvement in wins in all of baseball in 2013.

While Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem (as modified by others over the years) has a lot of value as an evaluation tool, it can be misleading and Cleveland’s 2012 performance is a perfect example of why that can be. It is true, that if you look at Cleveland’s actual runs scored and runs allowed, the Indians were lucky in how those figures converted into actual wins (to the tune of an extra 4 wins – see above.) However, I also examined how unlucky Cleveland was at converting its actual offensive and pitching performance into runs scored and runs allowed. Once you look at the first derivative, if you will, and then apply the Pythagorean Theorem, we see that Cleveland was actually a 70-win team in 68-win clothes last year, not a 64-win team as some analysts believe. That’s important because the Indians, like the Blue Jays made some notable changes to its roster, and not only do I think they are of a bigger marginal magnitude, I think Cleveland was starting from a higher baseline. That, in a nutshell, is why you’ll see a higher prediction for Cleveland’s wins at the bottom of this piece than was posted at the end of Toronto’s essay.

In the Tigers’ preview yesterday it was noted that Detroit had replaced two of the six worst-performing everyday players in baseball from 2012. Well, the very worst player was Cleveland’s Casey Kotchman who hit .229/.280/.333 over 500 plate appearances. That would be borderline terrible for an American League shortstop (averages of .255/.306/.368 in 2012) but Kotchman played first base, home of the best hitting players in the majors. When you realize the average AL first baseman hit .258/.336/.442 you see how big a hole Kotchman’s performance put the Indians’ offense in. This year, first base will be manned by recently signed free-agent Nick Swisher. That is a massive upgrade, worth at least 50 runs based on the consistent offense Swisher has produced over the last seven years.

While there are essentially three other lineup changes, even the one that looks bad on paper (Mark Reynolds for Travis Hafner at DH) is actually going to be additive in 2013. But Hafner was barely healthy in 2012 and the combination of he and all the other DH’s Cleveland used combined for a hitting line of .226/.317/.385. Mark Reynolds is going to strike out a lot more than the 120 times the aggregate DHs for Cleveland did last year, and some of those predictable at bats will drive fans crazy. But if you cherry pick his worst years as a pro, Reynolds has never had an on-base percentage less than .320 nor a slugging percentage less than .429 both of which will produce materially more runs for the Indians than its DHs did last year.

Taken together the other two changes are a big net win for Cleveland as well. Michael Bourn replaces the 2012 replacement level performances of Shelly Duncan and Johnny Damon in the outfield while Drew Stubbs will take over for Shin-Soo Choo in right field. Choo bounced back from an injury-plagued 2011 season to have a very productive year at the plate. Stubbs can’t match that offensive output, but Stubbs is a far better fielder perhaps evening out the loss of offense. With Bourn in center and Stubbs in right, the Indians are hoping to aid its low strike-out staff with stellar defense.

Cleveland has replaced some of its weakest 2012 performers and the best part is that the core that they didn’t touch – Carlos Santana at catcher, Michael Brantley in left field, and the double play combination of Jason Kipnis and Asdrubal Cabrera – are all going to be 26 or 27 this year and primed at all play at an All-Star level. New manager Terry Francona has inherited a great situation.

As good as the improvements on offense look on paper, there will also be material improvements on the other side of the ledger. The Indians allowed the most runs in the American League because their starting pitching was terrible, the relievers pitched their worst in the most important situations, and the defense was awful. The defense has been addressed and improved but how about the pitching staff? Cleveland’s starters were 29th (2nd to last) in the majors striking batters out but also walked batters at the 3rd highest rate. That is simply a deadly combination.

The biggest contributors to that problems are gone. Derek Lowe and Jeanmar Gomez started 38 games and walked more batters than they struck out. In this day and age, you cannot survive as a major league pitcher if you have a K/BB ratio anywhere close to 1, let alone below it. Also out of the rotation are Corey Kluber (5.14 ERA in 12 starts) and Josh Tomlin (5.72 ERA in 16 starts). In replacing all of those innings, the Indians can expect virtually guaranteed improvement from free-agent signee Brett Myers while merely hoping for good health and a league-average performance from Daisuke Matsuzaka. It’s harder to see but with the other three starters (Jimenez, Masterson, and McAllister) still in their 20s, it’s reasonable to think that at the worst their 2013 ERAs will match their skill sets and fall, on average, about half-a-run every nine innings. Over 600 innings that extremely modest outlook would result in a 35-run drop in total runs allowed. The bullpen has essentially been remade with only the top three performers from last season returning. It’s wholesale personnel changes like that that explain why bullpens are always more likely to perform at a league-average level a year after outlying performance in either direction. Just an average bullpen performance for the Indians would save another 30 runs compared to 2012.

The changes the Toronto Blue Jays made to their lineup seem to have captured the imagination of baseball fans and commentators to a greater degree than Cleveland’s. However, a close inspection of the marginal changes leads me to believe the Indians’ changes will lead to a larger increase in year-over-year runs scored. They’re in an easier division than the Blue Jays and while I’d rather have the Jays’ staff, improved defense is going to lead to stealth improvement in the runs allowed department as well.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: Saying Cleveland is going to be better this year surprises no one. Oddsmakers confirm this having set the opening total wins market at 76 ½, 8 ½ games higher than the amount they won last year. However, it’s the magnitude of improvement that is going to come as a surprise to everyone. Given that the Indians played to a 70-win performance last year, swapping Nick Swisher’s expected production for Casey Kotchman’s team-crushing ineptitude at the plate in 2012, nearly puts the 76 ½ total into play. But with many other improvements, this looks like an easy play to the upside. The Detroit Tigers are too good to consider challenging for the division and the Wild Card race is crowded with a number of teams with better pitching. Still, there is no reason Cleveland shouldn’t be a threat to stay above .500 and remain in the Wild Card race for the majority of the season. I enthusiastically support the over.

2013 Outlook:

85-77 – Second in AL Central

738 Runs Scored 699 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: CHICAGO WHITE SOX

What They Did: 85-77, 2nd Place AL Central.

Actual Runs: Scored 748 runs, Allowed 676.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 88.5 (3.5 above actual)

Restated: Scored 724 runs, Allowed 694.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 84.2 (0.8 below actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the White Sox, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 84 games.)



It’s disappointing if your favorite baseball team spends 126 calendar days in first place and doesn’t make the playoffs, but fans of the Chicago White Sox should be pleased with the 2012 effort of the South Siders. Thanks to excellent defense, (see the archives for Detroit’s preview which compared the Tigers and White Sox defense head-to-head) the spectacularly successful conversion of Chris Sale from the bullpen to the starting rotation, and a bevy of home runs which offset an otherwise pedestrian offense, the White Sox managed to spend the last four months of the season in the thick of the AL Central race. To contend with the Tigers, the White Sox needed a lot to go right last year and that’s exactly what happened, but thanks to changes to both teams – as well as a vastly improved Cleveland Indians squad – there is little chance of that happening in 2013.

One of the chief reasons Chicago hit 211 home runs, 3rd most in the majors, is that A.J. Pierzynski hit 27 home runs in 520 plate appearances. How unlikely was that? In his previous 1,538 plate appearances, over the prior three seasons, Pierzynski hit a total of 30 home runs. He was also 35 years old last year, not the age new, sustainable power skills typically emerge. Given that there was no way he would repeat that production in 2013, the White Sox shift to the 27-year old Tyler Flowers as its catcher is a preferable move. He has a history of patience and power in the minors and during sporadic starts for Chicago and while no one is projecting a repeat of Pierzynski’s performance last year, Flowers could minimize the drop-off from A.J.’s career year.

Other than Jeff Keppinger taking over for seven different players who started at third base in 2012, there are no other changes to the starting line up. Keppinger, at age 32, had his best year as a pro last year in Tampa and signed with Chicago in the off-season. His 2012 performance was aided by an abnormally high batting average on balls in play. If that sounds familiar it’s exactly the combination of events that led Cleveland to sign Casey Kotchman last year. The same Casey Kotchman who was MLB’s worst everyday player in 2012. The good news for White Sox fans is that offensively, third base was the worst hitting position on the team in 2012. Keppinger won’t likely change that but on the margin, he probably won’t hurt the White Sox on a year-over-year basis.

The stability of the White Sox roster also extends to the pitching staff. Philip Humber, who made 16 starts last year departed via free-agency, but his replacement in the rotation is familiar to Chicago’s fans. John Danks started nine games in 2012 before a shoulder injury ended his year. The stability actually helps with forecasting as last year the White Sox starting pitchers had an ERA of 4.15, 7th in the league, with peripheral skill-set readings of about the same magnitude. They were aided by well-above average defense, but they get hurt by the home-run friendly confines of their home ball park. There is no reason to suspect a material difference in performance this year.

The bullpen was also 7th in the league in ERA, had results roughly equivalent to its members’ skill sets, and have most of the bullpen returning.

So here’s the summary of the South Siders from 2012 to 2013: They should expect at least a small decline in health (eight players had more than 500 plate appearances, tied with the Angels for highest in baseball) which will take a small toll on production. 2012 saw career-high (in some cases, exceptionally high) HR/FB rates for a number of hitters (notably Adam Dunn and Dayan Viciedo) that is unlikely to be repeated. As the White Sox are so dependent on home runs to score, any drop will take its toll. No one thinks Tyler Flowers can match A.J. Pierzynski’s career year and the defense projects to regress a little bit from last year’s superb levels. Those are all small nicks but taken together, it adds up to a 30 run drop in production. The fact that the White Sox employed some cluster luck to score 24 more runs than expected will come back to roost as well. Put it all together and the White Sox project to score 54 less runs, and look unlikely to post a .500 level performance in an improved division.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: There’s nothing sexy or particularly eye-opening in this outlook. The White Sox will face improved teams throughout the entire division and look to be subject to small regression issues in a number of different categories. A lot went right for Chicago last year and this year, despite having a nearly identical roster, it’s expected that natural variance will replace that good fortune, not necessarily with misfortune, but with a more realistic record. Vegas opened the White Sox at 80 ½ wins. I wouldn’t necessarily be an under player but I can foresee a finish ten games below that level a lot more easily than a finish even seven games above it.


2013 Outlook:

77-85 – Third in AL Central

694 Runs Scored 730 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: KANSAS CITY ROYALS


What They Did: 72-90, 3rd Place AL Central.

Actual Runs: Scored 676 runs, Allowed 746.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 73.7 (1.7 above actual)

Restated: Scored 677 runs, Allowed 783.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 70.3 (1.7 below actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Royals, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 70 games.)



Sabermetric types – at least those who are attacked for working out of their mother’s basement – are frequently scolded by baseball insiders as not understanding the softer skills that are needed to run a baseball team. “You can’t run a baseball team treating your players like Strat-O-Matic cards” and “this isn’t fantasy baseball” are two commonly heard refrains. While I don’t dispute that – I’ve yet to encounter a workforce that is immune to the effects of a positive or negative workplace environment – that doesn’t mean there isn’t something to be gained by listening to the boxer-clad, out-of-work, “When is dinner ready, Mom?” crowd. For instance, fantasy players (especially in auction leagues) know that to win your league your players as a whole must produce more points-per-dollars than other teams’ players do. Everything you do as a manager is done with an eye on that metric.

When a major league baseball team operates under a salary cap – either league- or self-imposed – it is faced with the same constraint. A fixed amount of money will be spent on talent and it is imperative that some of those players produce at a level that exceeds their cost. Otherwise it’s impossible for your team to be any better than league-average. For instance, for the Los Angeles Angels it is extremely unlikely, bordering on impossible, for Albert Pujols to provide the Angels with more value than he costs. His ten-year contract (at an average of $24 million a year) pays him as if he will perform at the MVP-caliber level he performed at in the prior ten years. There is little to no upside – in terms of performance per dollar spent – for the Angels in that agreement. Additionally, thanks to an egregious error in judgment, the Angels will be paying Vernon Wells, who will and should spend most of the year on the bench, more than $24.6 million this year. And yet, in terms of the Angles ability to compete for the pennant this year, none of that matters. Why? Because Mike Trout makes $510,000 and he’ll produce runs that will easily pay for the cost of Wells’ salary. The existence of Mike Trout covers up every previous salary allocation error the Angels have made.

If the Angels need a Mike Trout-like over-performer – and they don’t operate in anything that resembles the revenue shackles that Kansas City does – think about how much the Royals need one.

That is why trading #1 ranked minor league prospect Wil Myers to Tampa Bay for James Shields, as the Royals did this winter, was such a mistake. It was probably the most high-profile trade of the off-season and while there were some other parts to the trade (the Royals gave up additional minor-league talent and also picked up starter Wade Davis) the trade boiled down to swapping the best hitting prospect in the entire minor leagues for a borderline ace starting pitcher.

Are the Royals better this year as a result of the trade? Without question. Will they be better next year? Almost certainly, yes. Why is it a bad deal? Because with Shields on board at a cost of more than $23 million for two years, there is very little upside in terms of production (in this case, runs suppressed rather than runs created) per dollar spent. And the Kansas City Royals have traditionally had very limited dollars to spent compared to the rest of the teams in baseball. Wil Myers is now a cost controlled asset for the Tampa Bay Rays. In financial market terms, the Kansas City Royals have given away their upside – and that’s a mistake no veteran of fantasy baseball would ever make.

This team capsule will be light on actual player discussions because the Royals return virtually the exact same roster of everyday players. The only changes are to back-up catcher and back-up shortstop, and this from the team that had an extremely stable lineup last year with only 14 players getting 100 or more plate appearances. The entire starting lineup is on the right side of 30 and they’ve all been together for a while. That’s a nice formula for a possible breakout year for the offense. The problem is, despite fielding a youthful team that once possessed huge upside in the minors, there are only three starters which have demonstrated above-average offensive skills in the major leagues – and the Royals are fast running out of “small sample size” defenses. Alex Gordon, after two stellar years at the plate, is a bona-fide star in left field. Salvador Perez, based on his 450 plate appearances in the majors over the last two years, replaces Buster Posey as the most exciting young catcher with enormous upside potential in baseball. (I do not mean to imply he’s better than Posey by any means, only that the reigning MVP, a legitimate superstar for the Giants, no longer fits the “potential” description.) Designated hitter Billy Butler, a modern day rarity in that he possesses power and a low-strikeout rate, is one of the more underrated players in the game. Beyond that, most of the production was well-below average. That does leave a lot of upside but given that they’ve had ample chance to display that upside the last two years, from a projection standpoint, it’s hard to see a team that was 20th in runs scored last year suddenly get into the top quartile.

Even if everything does go right on offense and a number of the twentysomethings have breakout years, the pitching staff is still a problem. It’s better, for sure, anchored by Shields. The Royals were only one of five starting rotations with an ERA above 5.00 last year. In the trade with the Rays, the Royals have replaced the worst offenders in the rotation with Davis and Shields and also signed free-agent Ervin Santana to a very questionable, very large contract. He makes them better, but the Royals seem to think they were just a couple of starters away from contending.

If that’s the way the front office is thinking, I think they’re mistaken. They see a young lineup about to make “the leap” but upside explosion would be more likely if they were starting from a higher baseline, like league-average. The bullpen may have had the 5th best ERA in baseball, but based on the skill sets of the underlying pitchers, they only had the 15th best expected ERA suggesting material regression in 2013. Finally the entire pitching staff was, for the second year in a row, made to look better by a quirky fielding factor.

Last year I pointed out that the 2011 Royals – despite being a below-average fielding team overall – managed to record 51 outfield assists, essentially twice the MLB average. Outfield assists are undoubtedly skill-based but similar to fumble recovery in the NFL are extremely volatile from year-to-year. I pointed out that outfield assists have a huge impact on runs allowed because they remove players that are about to score or at least have a high-probability of scoring. I also showed that like NFL teams that limited the interception of say, Deion Sanders, by not throwing his way, opponents had a say in reducing outfield assists. That’s why previous teams that led the league in outfield assists, especially those with such a huge number, always showed sharp drops the next year. The 2012 Royals mocked me by recording another 51 outfield assists last year. (Three of the other top five teams from 2011 were below-average in 2012.) Yes, it’s skill-based but I still contend it won’t happen again this year, and it’s a large reason why the Royals actual runs allowed in 2012 look so much better than its restated runs allowed at the top of this essay. I would not count on that happening again this year.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: With their total wins set at 79 games last year, I opined the Royals were one of the easiest unders on the board last spring. Even with the help of what I considered unsustainable help from those highly-variable outfield assists, the Royals were an easy under. To give you an idea of how wildly unrealistic last year’s expectations were, Kansas City is much better this year, thanks to upgrades to the starting pitching. And yet their opening total wins market in 2013 is just 77 ½. That’s pretty much exactly where I have them finishing. I will acknowledge however, the outlook is very different from last year. Last year, I thought the Royals upside was where others had their as their consensus. This year, I see their potential to finish above or below consensus skewed significantly to the upside, but I still can’t see them realistically contending for a Wild Card spot late in the season.

2013 Outlook:

77-85 – Fourth in AL Central

709 Runs Scored 750 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: MINNESOTA TWINS


What They Did: 66-96, 5th Place AL Central.

Actual Runs: Scored 701 runs, Allowed 832.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 68.4 (2.4 above actual)

Restated: Scored 687 runs, Allowed 797.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 70.0 (4.0 above actual)

(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Twins, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 70 games.)



Last year, the front offices of the Colorado Rockies and Pittsburgh Pirates provided an interesting contrast in understanding the environment they operated in. The Pirates, smarting from a second-half collapse in 2011, identified a crucial weakness: team defense. Largely happy with the offensive potential of many of its young players, management made just minor changes to the lineup. However, recognizing that reducing the number of balls hit into the field of play effectively deemphasizes the impact of defense, the Pirates remade their starting rotation with high strikeout pitchers. Pittsburgh may have had another second-half collapse last season but it was offense related. Even though they weren’t much better on defense, they gave up 38 less runs than in 2011 thanks to the change in roster construction.

The Rockies front office, on the other hand, remade their pitching staff with pitch-to-contact, extreme fly ball pitchers, plus signed a free-agent outfielder (Michael Cuddyer) known to have terrible range in the field, an absolutely insane combination for a team that plays half of its games at Coors Field. Colorado suffered an unfathomable 116-run increase in runs allowed in 2012.

Who do you think we should compare to the Twins’ front office?

One of the reasons that scoring has dropped in baseball the last few years is that pitchers are striking out more batters. Since 2005, when pitchers struck out 16.5% of the batters they faced, the rate at which batters have struck out has increased ever single year – seven straight seasons – resulting in 19.8% of all 2012 plate appearances ending in a strikeout. With such a huge increase in the strikeout environment, you’d expect that change to be reflected at the individual team level as well. Sure enough if you look at the teams who struck out batters at the greatest rate in that eight-year period (2005-2012) no team prior to 2009 is in the top 20 and only one (from 2008) is in the top 25. Not surprisingly, the bottom 20 is entirely populated with teams from the early part of that era – with one exception. The Minnesota Twins are the only franchise since 2010 to appear in the bottom 30 of that list. In 2012, the Twins staff only struck out 15.2% of the batters they faced. The next worse team was the Indians at 17.3%, a huge 2.1% gap. (The gap between those two teams (30th and 29th) was larger than the gap between 29th and 18th in the league.)

As a result, the Twins gave up the second most runs in the American League, and when you adjust for park effects (Target Field suppresses runs) they were the worst. So the Twins clearly need to find a way to improve its pitching staff and find hurlers who can strike out more batters.

Well Minnesota went out and made changes to its staff as the three pitchers who made the most starts for the Twins in 2012 are no longer with the team. They were replaced by Vance Worley, Mike Pelfrey, and Kevin Correia. Worley has seen his strikeout rate drop at least 2% each year for the last two years to the point that he is a below-average strikeout pitcher at the age of 25. That is not the age a pitcher should be seeing his strikeout rate take an alarming drop. He’s also the new ace of the Twins staff.

Mike Pelfrey – and this was before he underwent Tommy John surgery – has struck out less than 13% of the batters he’s faced in his six year career. 13% is abominable for a starter and always places you near the bottom of the league. Then there is Kevin Correia. 78 MLB pitchers threw at least 300 innings over the last two years and the one with the lowest strikeout rate – at 12.0% -- was Kevin Correia.

That’s really all we need to cover in the Twins preview. Minnesota is going to give up the most runs in the American League this year and it’s going to be because of roster construction. If they have any injuries to Mauer, Willingham, or Morneau a decent line up suddenly looks much weaker and they just may be “battling” Houston for the worst record in the league.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: The Twins collapse from perennial AL Central contender to cellar dweller began with a string of injuries in 2011 and there is no guarantee that they will bottom out this year. Oddsmakers see it much the same way, opening Minnesota’s at 67. That market is a full seven wins higher than the Astros and I’m not sure they are going to look any different by the end of the year. I’ll express that opinion by taking the Astros over (as mentioned in Houston’s essay) and leave this one alone.

2013 Outlook:

66-96 – Fifth in AL Central

677 Runs Scored 828 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: WASHINGTON NATIONALS

What They Did: 98-64, 1st Place NL East. Lost 3-2 in NLDS

Actual Runs: Scored 731 runs, Allowed 594.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 96.2 (1.8 below actual)

Restated: Scored 745 runs, Allowed 609.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 95.8 (1.2 below actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Nationals, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 96 games.)



“We’re livin’ in the future and none of this has happened yet.” – Bruce Springsteen, Living in the Future

A year ago, it wasn’t too hard to see that the Washington Nationals had a bright future. Despite the fact that the franchise had never had a winning record since moving from Montreal to Washington D.C. before the 2005 season, all those losing records and last place finishes had started to pay off in the form of talented draft picks. Washington had a bevy of young players that seemed certain to challenge for NL East supremacy . . . eventually. But last year? Last year, super-prospect Bryce Harper was just 19 years-old and expected to spend the majority, if not all, of 2012 in the minors. Stephen Strasburg was still adjusting to his recovery from Tommy John surgery, having appeared in just five late-season games in 2011. Danny Espinosa and Ian Desmond were a promising pair of middle infielders, Wilson Ramos had flashed potential at catcher and the pitching staff looked to get 150 starts from five starters who were all in their twenties but for the most part, all of this was filed under the heading of “potential”. That potential would have been realized and the season probably would have been considered a success if the Nationals won more games than they lost, emerged as a legitimate threat to the Phillies and possibly, if everything went right, competed for the newly expanded Wild Card.

Well everything certainly went right, and at least one year ahead of schedule the Nationals had the best record in the majors. With their youth in such obvious contrast to the Phillies’ aging and injured roster, before the season even ended, everyone could see that the NL East torch had been passed 125 miles south down I-95.

For the Nats in 2013, Denard Span replaces Mike Morse in the outfield and catchers Kurt Suzuki and Ramos should make more plate appearances than the combined 260 they amassed last year, replacing the only true weakness in the Nationals 2012 lineup. While Span makes the defense better, he doesn’t have the power Morse does and Desmond, who hit 25 home runs in fewer at bats than he hit 8 and 10 home runs in his two prior seasons respectively, is the one player you’d expect significant regression from. Otherwise, it looks to me like the offensive projection for the Nationals at the bottom of this page looks very conservative.

The Nationals only have two notable changes on the other half of their roster. 2012 closer Tyler Clippard has been demoted to set-up man as the Nationals signed Rafael Soriano to a very large free agent contract. In a vacuum, the signing of Soriano looks like a waste of money. Make no mistake, Soriano is immensely talented and a bit more suited for the closer’s role than Clippard whose mildly above-average walk rate and extreme fly ball tendencies could present problems. However, as the Phillies (Jonathan Papelbon) and the Reds (Ryan Madson) learned last year spending excessively on a closer can hamstring a front office in making in-season or future roster moves. However, that’s not the case with Washington. Because the Nationals have so much young talent making less money – by far – than they are producing (in runs created or suppressed which equates to wins), they have what I’d call a budget surplus. So while spending $14 million a year on Soriano is a vast overpay, the team’s overall payroll is defensible. Fans should commend the front office for at least spending the excess value they accrued from having young talent as opposed to keeping it for themselves.

There is one other interesting change to the pitching staff worth looking at and it might have value to fantasy players. I’d stay away from Dan Haren. Haren, (career ERA 3.66) is replacing Edwin Jackson (career ERA 4.40) in the starting rotation. Based on name recognition and prior reputations, that would appear to be a big upgrade. However, my model sees a guy, in Haren, who has had a declining strikeout rate, as a percentage of batters faced, four years in a row to the point that he was merely average for a starting pitcher in 2012. At the same time, his groundball rate, always low, dropped to bottom quadrant low last year. Most alarmingly, his fastball velocity averaged just 88.5 mph last year, continuing a trend of decline that began in 2005 but truly accelerated in 2012. It appeared Haren was living on borrowed time since at least 2011 and it caught up with him last year. Jackson’s 2012 ERA at 4.03 may have looked unattractive compared to his other rotation mates, but Nationals fans shouldn’t automatically assume Haren will improve on that production in 2013. Haren has gotten away with those declining skills in Anaheim where he made 39 of his 64 starts the last two years in cavernous stadiums (Anaheim, Oakland, and Seattle). Unless he’s recovered from an undisclosed injury, don’t be surprised if he sports a mid-4.00 ERA this season.



Oddsmakers’ expectations: I think the below projection is conservative for the Nationals. One of the reasons is that player projections must always incorporate a regression to the mean from one year to the next. The problem is that it should be regression to the player’s mean not regression to the MLB mean. Key offensive contributors to the Nationals success in 2012 are young enough that we don’t know if their mean is significantly above the league mean and the assumption therefore in modeling is that it is not. I suspect, however, that it is higher and believe the offense is a threat to score 800 runs this year and cruise to a division title. Vegas has them at 91 ½ wins and even there I think the chance of 100 wins is greater than the chance of 83. In the NL East, like Larry Bird famously uttered before a three-point shooting contest, everyone else is playing for second place.

2013 Outlook:

90-72 – First in NL East

741 Runs Scored 658 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: PHILADELPHIA PHILLIES

What They Did: 81-81, 3rd Place NL East.

Actual Runs: Scored 684 runs, Allowed 680.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 81.4 (0.4 above actual)

Restated: Scored 679 runs, Allowed 662.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 82.9 (1.9 above actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Phillies, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 83 games.)


“The Phillies are a collection of broken-down, overpaid players who all got old at the same time last year – just like the Yankees this year. They won’t be a factor again for years.” As I said, on the surface that’s understandable because after winning the NL East five straight times, Philadelphia did crash and burn last year struggling to play .500 baseball, never factoring in the NL East race, and finishing 17 games out of first place. Let’s look beneath the surface, however.

All the damage to the Phillies’ season occurred in the first half of the year. They entered the All-Star break 13 games under .500 and in last place in the NL East by five games. Yes, comfortably behind the Mets and Marlins. Chase Utley and Ryan Howard had barely played (44 total plate appearances), Cliff Lee had 1 win in 14 starts, and the bullpen had an ERA barely under 5.00. The Phillies lost their first game after the break and then . . . few noticed what happened. For the rest of the year, Philadelphia played .600 baseball and only lost 30 games – exactly the same as the 98-win Nationals and just one loss more than the Atlanta Braves. In other words, once reasonably healthy, Philadelphia played the second half of the season on a par with the best teams in the league. (San Francisco and Cincinnati were each a game or two better, respectively, in the loss column than the Braves.)

The question is do the Phillies, and their aging core, have one last season in them to chase a post-season berth? The Phils path to 90 wins is as easy to define as any team in the league. They have to win 60% of the 90+ games started by Roy Halladay, Cole Hamels, and Cliff Lee and then split the other roughly 70 started by Kyle Kendrick, newly acquired John Lannan and whoever else fills out the rotation. Stated in those terms, it’s an achievable goal.

Even with the mid-season trades of Shane Victorino and Hunter Pence, and even getting just half-seasons from Utley and a clearly still-hobbled Howard, the Phillies managed to have a league-average offense. 8th in the NL in runs scored, 7th in batting average, 9th in on-base percentage, and 7th in slugging. Unless injuries ravage the offense in 2013, the offense will almost certainly be better and therefore above league-average. Why? Look at the ballast the Phillies were carrying all while achieving a league-average offense. Juan Pierre and Placido Polanco amassed nearly 800 appearances in 2012 and hit a grand total of three home runs. Let’s put that into perspective. 3 home runs in 767 ABs for Pierre and Polanco. NL pitchers hit 24 home runs in 5,594 ABs. You see where this is leading? That’s right – you could randomly watch the at-bat of any pitcher in the NL in 2012 and you had a better chance of seeing a home run hit than if you watched Pierre or Polanco hit, two players manning the premium hitting positions of corner outfielder and corner infielder for the Phillies.

John Mayberry, Jr. and Ty Wigginton made more than 800 plate appearances combined and barely got on base at a .300 clip and both slugged beneath .400. That wouldn’t be bad -- if they were shortstops. But all their playing time came at corner outfield positions and first base. Michael Young (age) and Delmon Young (defense) come to the Phillies in 2013 with flaws, Dominic Brown has struggled with injuries himself but just two years ago he was Mike Trout and Wil Myers (the number 1 ranked minor league prospect in baseball) but even with flaws and question marks, they should help the offense produce materially more runs than the players they’re replacing. Finally, Ryan Howard hit .219/.295/.423 in the 71 games he appeared in after rupturing his Achilles tendon in the last game of the 2011 season. Including last season, his career figures are .271/.364/.551. He’s a strong candidate for an Adam Dunn-like bounce back year in 2013.

Much maligned, and frankly with good reason, the Phillies front office actually did a terrific job of quietly remaking the bullpen as the season went on. First-half disasters Chad Qualls, Joe Savery, and Jose Contreras were released, replaced by a combination of low-cost, high-strikeout, low-walk arms that allowed Charlie Manuel to match-up against hitters on both sides of the plate. Owing to Papelbon’s massive salary, the money may not have been allocated correctly, but the Phillies enter the season with one of the top bullpens in the NL.

With a mildly above average offense, and a top-tier bullpen they can get to 90 wins if they can keep their above-30-year old talent on the field. Reports out of Spring Training do not sound good for Roy Halladay which is the only thing that tempers this preview versus expectations. If he is finished, if his drop in fastball velocity in 2012 was the product of permanent wear and tear and not due to a healable injury, the Phillies will need to replace his 30+ starts with a replacement level pitcher and that likely makes them a .500 team.



Oddsmakers’ expectations: The Phillies had a miserable first-half of the season last year creating the impression that their time as a contender has passed. It’s not an entirely misplaced opinion, as the team’s core is old and the Nationals are clearly a younger, better team. But there is so much room for improvement when you look at the departed batters and relievers that contributed significantly to last year’s problems. If Howard is only going to slug .400 and if Halladay is a shell of his former self, the Phillies need to look to 2015 and beyond, and a mid-season purge of tradable assets will be appropriate. I tend to think a lot of that is priced into the Phillies total wins market of 82 ½. Look back at the top of this piece – the Phillies were an 83-win team last year. When you look at their season from the standpoint of who got plate appearances and who pitched innings, the marginal changes to the lineup and pitching staff this year flat-out make them better. I’ll take the over. Due to the questionable health of Halladay however, I can’t recommend this over to anywhere near the degree of say, Cleveland and Tampa.

2013 Outlook:

86-76 – Second in NL East

702 Runs Scored 652 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: ATLANTA BRAVES

What They Did: 94-68, 2nd Place NL East. Lost in Wild Card Round.

Actual Runs: Scored 700 runs, Allowed 600.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 92.3 (1.7 below actual)

Restated: Scored 675 runs, Allowed 610.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 88.5 (5.5 below actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Braves, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 89 games.)



The figures above give the first clue as to why we don’t have the Braves repeating as post season participants in 2013 and even, shockingly, finishing behind the Phillies. They may have won 94 games last year but the Braves benefited from cluster luck a little bit on offense, a little bit while pitching, and then had some further luck in how the sequencing of their actual runs scored and allowed, all adding up to the tune of about 5 games. My numbers viewed the Braves as a 94-win team in 89-win clothing.

Now an 89-win team is still a top tier team and always deserving of a playoff berth especially in the expanded Wild Card format that began last year. An 89-win team is collection of players who combined to perform at a level 46 wins above replacement level. (For this example, I’m using FanGraphs 43-win replacement level baseline as all the individual WARs I’m going to cite come from FanGraphs.)

Collectively, the Braves everyday players amassed about 29 WAR and the pitchers about 18. (Please excuse rounding differences, in this case 47 total WAR versus my theoretical 46 from above.) Here’s a list of the top five everyday player contributors:

Jason Heyward 6.6

Michael Bourn 6.4

Martin Prado 5.9

Dan Uggla 3.5

Chipper Jones 3.0

That’s more than 25 of the total 29 WAR everyday players produced and Braves fans will surely note, 15.3 of that WAR, in the form of Bourn, Prado, and Jones, will not be with the team in 2013. Sure, B.J. Upton and Justin Upton are exciting additions to the team’s outfield for years to come but on a year-over-year basis are they going to improve on the 12+ WAR performances of Bourn and Prado in 2012?

B.J. Upton played centerfield for the Tampa Bay Rays for six full seasons and only once was his performance even low enough to be called league-average (2009). In every other year he’s consistently been an above average player, flirting with All-Star level performance in 2008. He’s pretty established, at age 28, as a very consistent, 4 WAR player. Justin Upton, his younger brother by three years, has a little more volatility and therefore a little more upside as well. In 2011, Justin garnered well deserved MVP support and finished fourth in the balloting. He returned to a roughly league-average level last year and apparently a conflict with Arizona management led to his trade. It was a great pick-up for the Braves as he is signed to a very reasonable contract through 2015. If the Upton brothers each match the best season of their entire career, they will produce 11.4 wins in 2013 – a one game drop compared to the men they are replacing. And, of course, a projection system does not call for them both to have career years in the same season.

I think it goes without saying that a third base platoon of Cincinnati Reds cast-off Juan Francisco and Houston Astros cast-off Chris Johnson aren’t expected to equal Chipper Jones’ production. (Let’s put it this way, if Johnson and/or Francisco retired after last year, I doubt Brian Cashman would be putting out feelers to see if they wanted to play one more year in pinstripes.)

A trio of 23-year olds may prevent the offense from falling off too much though. Heyward has the right mix of skills and age to suggest his tremendous year last year could be the start of multiple All-Star campaigns and Freddie Freeman impressed by increasing his walks and cutting down on his strikeouts in 2012, suggesting he is the Braves first baseman of the future. Finally, mid-season call-up Andrelton Simmons solved the shortstop problem created by the early season performances of Paul Janish and Tyler Pastornicky. Brian McCann had the worst year of his career at the age-draining position of catcher and he no longer has super-sub Brian Ross to spell him, backed up this year instead by the pedestrian Gerald Laird. Since McCann typically misses 40 games a year that’s an important factor. Put it all together and while there is upside to the Uptons – especially Justin who has the explosive power to carry a team for a month – there is plenty of volatility to the downside as well. The Braves will do well to match last year’s run production.

The case for a regression on the run suppression side of the ledger isn’t quite as easy to understand but it’s there nonetheless. Kris Medlen was incredible in the second half of 2012 going 9-0 as a starter of 12 games and posting an ERA of 0.97 in 83 innings of work. He’s good – he’s really good as evidenced by his high strikeout, extremely low-walk skill set – but no starter is 1.00 ERA good. He could still be great in 2013 and give up as many runs in April as he gave up as a starter all last year (11). To a lesser degree that could happen to the rest of the returning rotation as well. Finally, newly installed fifth starter Julio Teheran may have a lot of potential, but he also had a lot of trouble striking out batters in a full season of AAA pitching last year – a data point that usually bodes poorly for MLB success. In the bullpen, there really aren’t enough superlatives to describe closer Craig Kimbrel’s 2012 season. The entire bullpen is really good, but even a superior bullpen can be expected to have an ERA of say, 3.25. That’s a half-run higher than Atlanta’s allowed last year. Over nearly 500 innings or work, that’s an increase of about 25 runs.

Finally, Atlanta had the best defense in the National League last year. According to the game charters, a lot of that was due to the play of Michael Bourn and Marin Prado (as well as Jason Heyward). Replacing Bourn and Prado, along with the natural volatility that results from leading the league in defense, projects to cost the Braves about 20 additional runs this year.



Oddsmakers’ expectations: Atlanta certainly earned its place in the post-season last year, even if it ended after just one controversial, infield fly-marred game. But a lot went right for them in 2012, and even more importantly some key contributors to that success are gone this year. Atlanta had some splashy off-season acquisitions which may have masked the reality of this year’s task. Vegas opened the Braves at 87 ½ wins. Frankly, I’m thinking the books down there are on to me as I thought it would open even closer to 90. Still, just like the other team to make name-recognized changes in the off-season, the Toronto Blue Jays, I like the under here a lot.

2013 Outlook:

82-80 – Third in NL East

677 Runs Scored 670 Runs Allowed

2013 PREVIEW: NEW YORK METS

What They Did: 74-88, 4th Place NL East.

Actual Runs: Scored 650 runs, Allowed 709.

Expected wins based on RS and RA: 74.6 (0.6 above actual)

Restated: Scored 655 runs, Allowed 670.

Exp. wins based on restated RS and RA: 79.4 (5.4 above actual)



(Glossary: Expected wins, based on a modification of Bill James’ Pythagorean Theorem, are the amount of wins a team should win in any season based on the amount of runs it actually scored and allowed. Deviations will be explained in the appropriate team capsules.

Restated Runs Scored and Runs Allowed are the amount of runs a team should have tallied based on its actual components of batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging achieved/allowed. In the case of the Mets, if they posted exactly the same stats in 2013 as 2012, they should expect to win 79 games.)



As a baseball fan/analyst, the NY Mets are frustrating. Die-hard fans of the Mets feel so habitually tortured and humiliated that a written, comprehensive study of the fan base should be titled Fifty Shades of Shea.

After 81 games, or half the season, the Mets were on a pace to win 88 games in 2012 and were 3 ½ games out of first place and just ½ game out in the Wild Card race (ahead of both eventual Wild Card winners, Atlanta, and St. Louis.) They imploded in the second half and an autopsy of the results reveals one key reason. The Mets had an average defense. They had just a mildly below-average offense, once you factor in park effects. They had above-average starting pitching. So why did they finish 14 games under .500? Because they had the second worst bullpen in all of baseball.

Bullpens are the easiest and cheapest parts of a team to fix. Worst-to-first stories invariably feature remade bullpens. Take a look at these last 3 surprising teams:

Season Team Prior Year Bullpen Rank Surprise Season Rank

2011 Arizona 30th 14th

2012 Oakland 18th 4th

2012 Baltimore 27th 5th

The lesson here is that if your bullpen had an outsized influence on a disappointing season, you might be closer to competing next year than you think. Here’s how it applies to the Mets: As shown above, the Mets played to 79-win talent last year. Their bullpen, in 459 innings pitched, had an ERA of 4.65, 29th in the majors. A league-average bullpen had an ERA of 3.67. If they could improve to merely league average, the Mets would chop their runs allowed by a whopping 50 in 2013. 50 runs equates to just over 5 wins. Those wins added to the 79.4 from 2012 means the Mets – had they done some bullpen revamping – could have looked at their starting pitchers and everyday players and very realistically had 85-win expectations.

If you were management and knew your team had 85-win talent before looking at making offseason roster moves would you look to improve your team or blow it up? The answer is strikingly obvious to me and, to the surprise of no one who know how the Mets operate, management took an alternate route and blew up the team.

Gone is Cy Young Award winner R.A. Dickey who not only had a 2.67 ERA, he amassed that figure over 233 innings pitched – most in the National League. That is an incredibly valuable combination to a team (nearly exactly as valuable as Justin Verlander last year). Losing that staff anchor means everyone else moves up a slot in the rotation and in the end, Dickey’s innings will be replaced by some combination of a #5 and #6 starter plus additional bullpen work (expected ERA of at least 4.50). You can chop 5 wins off the Mets season right there and discard all the realistic dreams of playing meaningful September baseball.

The Mets didn’t totally sit still in the offseason which makes the jettisoning of Dickey all the more questionable. They should get upgraded production at the catcher position with John Buck replacing Josh Thole who had a miserable year at the plate as evidenced by a slugging percentage (.290) below his on-base percentage (.294). Jason Bay is gone taking his .165 batting average and sub-.300 slugging percentage with him, although his replacement Marlon Byrd, was, amazingly, even worse last year.

The sad reality is the Mets are set to waste yet another borderline-MVP season from David Wright, who finished in the Top 10 in MVP voting for the fourth time last year. He’s 30 this year and he’s going to start on the downside of his career soon. This was the year to see if he and Dickey, a revamped bullpen, and an improved offense could have reached the postseason. Given the path Mets management decided to take, there is no chance that will happen now.

Oddsmakers’ expectations: As you may recall from last year, the Mets were my favorite over selection last year with a closing market at 72 ½ wins. Seeing their ultimate 74-win total it may have looked hairy, but it really wasn’t. At no time during the season were the Mets playing at a pace to win less than 73 games and despite the second half collapse, they only needed to win one of their last six games to get there. This year the market opened at 75 ½ wins and it’s attracting some over interest from analysts I read. In fact, the largest over recommendation from Baseball Prospectus (based on the difference between their projected finish and Vegas’ opening lines) is the Mets who they see winning 81 games. I cannot back into that prediction at all. Last year was the year to be bullish on the Mets.

2013 Outlook:

74-88 – Fourth in NL East

644 Runs Scored 705 Runs Allowed